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ABSTRACT
PLANNING FOR THE REUSE OF CLOSING MILITARY BASES:
THE NEED FOR CONSENSUS BUILDING
by
Curtis Everett Cornelssen
Submitted to the Department of
Urban Studies and Planning in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the
Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
in Real Estate Development
Planning for the reuse of closing military bases is one of the most significant land use
issues currently faced by communities throughout the U.S. This process is
cumbersome due to the complexity of federal disposition procedures and the sheer
magnitude of such an endeavor. Yet, this effort is often further complicated by the
jurisdictional disputes which may erupt in the base transitioning process, often leading
to stalemate and delay.
This thesis focuses on the application of consensus building and mediated negotiation
in the military base reuse planning process. My hypothesis is that these tools may
be of value for the federal, state, and local authorities attempting to establish a
collaborative planning effort. My analysis shows that with mediation and active
federal involvement, some base closure conflict may be diffused. Chapter 1 provides
the context; Chapter 2 outlines the federal property disposal procedures; Chapters 3
and 4 look at two base closure cases where planning impasses occurred; Chapter 5
analyzes the facts of these cases from a conflict management and dispute resolution
perspective; and, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by suggesting proposals for applying
consensus building in the base closure environment.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael Wheeler
Title: Senior Lecturer, Department of
Urban Studies and Planning
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
1.0 Introduction
The end of the Cold War, as well as the fundamental restructuring of the U.S.
military has resulted in a series of military base closures which, with the exception
of the drawdown after World War II, is unprecedented in terms of land transfer and
economic impact.
For the communities affected by the closure, it is difficult to imagine what the
future holds for these massive land parcels in terms of ownership, control, and
economic development. Yet, perhaps even more daunting is the path that they must
follow. The challenges are awesome. After all, not only are the communities
dealing with planning for the reuse of what was, in most cases, one of the largest
economic engines in the region, they must also work with a complex, slow-moving
federal bureaucracy.
Major hurdles faced by the communities planning for reuse of the base include
complying with and working within the federal disposal process, adhering to federal
and state environmental laws, dealing with changing federal priorities, and
establishing some measure of control in the planning process.
The federal property "disposal" process is a formal set of statutory guidelines
and procedures which must be followed in the transfer of all federal land to local
public or private ownership. As the nomenclature suggests, this process is oriented
6
towards the federal withdrawal from ownership, with some anticipated "return on
investment" in terms of either sale of the property or cost savings (from no longer
having to maintain the property), or both. Unfortunately, these guidelines are time
consuming and confusing. Furthermore, the federal authorities tasked to carry out
the disposal action often apply the procedures in markedly different ways.
Coupled with the federal disposition guidelines, the environmental statutes
affecting base closure weave a more complicated web. The most pervasive of these
environmental laws is the Environmental Impact Review (EIR) process, where the
federal, state and local officials must coordinate to produce a comprehensive analysis
of the effects that existing and proposed uses will have on man's environment. The
EIR procedure is inextricably linked to the federal disposal process as the actions
typically occur simultaneously and, any proposed federal, state or local uses must be
considered in the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
Changing federal priorities add a new layer of complexity to the disposal and
reuse of military bases.1 The most clear change in direction came in the 1988 base
closure legislation, which shifted federal disposal objectives. Prior to the 1988 Base
Realignment and Closure Act (the first of the most recent base closure rounds), the
federal government position regarding excess land disposal was to expedite transfer
to the local community with no expectation of economic returns (other than the
From this point forward, I will refer to the overall process as either the "disposal process" or the "reuse
planning process." The former generally refers to the federal view of this effort, while the latter is the label
typically used by the states and local communities.
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ongoing operational savings). The federal intent subsequent to 1988 was to consider
obtaining some level of investment return from the "sale" of excess bases.2
Although this policy has changed somewhat since 1990, it has complicated many of
the base reuse efforts throughout the country.
Recently, the Clinton Administration responded to these issues by publishing
a five-point plan to "revitalize" base closure communities.3 The Clinton plan goes
a long way in refocusing federal objectives from a property "sale" approach to a
"jobs-centered property disposal" system. The most striking change with this new
plan is to allow federal authorities to convey federal property for economic
development either free or at a steep discount.4 Other aspects of this new strategy
include easy access to transition and development help, fast-track cleanup, transition
coordinators, and larger economic development planning grants.5
These measures are likely to have a positive impact on current base disposal
actions. Yet, according to many experts deeply involved in this endeavor, one of the
greatest challenges which communities face is developing consensus among the
2 Interview with Dr. John Lynch, Former Associate Director, Office of Economic Adjustment, Washington,
D.C., June 8, 1993.
3 White House Press Release, July 2, 1993, "Revitalizing Base Closure Communities," Office of the
President of the U.S., Washington, D.C.
4 According to the Clinton proposal, before the land is transferred, the community economic development
proposal must meet "strict tests for economic viability and job creation. "(These requirement are yet to be
defined).
s White House Press Release, "Revitalizing Base Closure Communities", July 2, 1993.
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different interests at the local level.6 When a base is announced for closure, the
communities must quickly establish some type of planning entity to work with the
federal and state authorities and begin to address potential reuses for the property.
In cases where only one community is affected, or, in situations where a well-
organized planning agency already exists, establishing a planning forum is less
problematic. Some cases, however, involve many different communities and special
interest groups. In these instances, marshalling a collaborative planning effort is
often a major hurdle.
As a result of the aforementioned complications, the base closure and reuse
planning process appears to be moving very slowly. For instance, of the 16 major
domestic bases that were to be closed as a result of the 1988 Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) action, only four are actually closed, only three have interim leases
in place for reuse, and no land has changed ownership.7 Furthermore, of the 26
major domestic bases to be closed as a result of the 1991 BRAC recommendations,
only five are closed, six have interim leases, and, as with the 1988 closures, no title
has been transferred.8
6 Based on interviews with representatives from the Office Of Economic Adjustment (OEA), Washington,
D.C. May-June 1993. The OEA is the federal agency with primary responsibility for acting as a liaison
between the federal government and state and local representatives in base disposal cases. As such, in my
view, these professionals are uniquely qualified to diagnose and assess problems associated with the
transitioning (planning) process.
Memorandum from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Subject: Strategy for Economic
Transition and Base Closure, Washington, D.C., June 3, 1993.
8 Ibid.
Local consensus is critical to the success of the reuse planning effort. After
all, following these complex procedures is cumbersome enough without the additional
complications resulting from unresolved disputes. The facts from historical and
recent closures suggest that these stalemates are costly in terms of time, legal
expenses, and lost opportunities.
In the recent lore of base disposal planning, two closures stand out as
"problem cases." 9 The first case, involving the closure and reuse of Hamilton Air
Force Base in Marin County, California, began in 1973 and is still being played out
today. The second case involves the recent closure of George AFB in San
Bernardino County, California. In both closures, consensus was never established
among the local communities involved in planning the reuse of the bases. The result
for Hamilton was gridlock and delay, with the federal government ending up holding
on to most of the property (and continuing to pay for its maintenance), with no new
economic development for the region. The outcome at George AFB is not altogether
different. The base was placed on the closure list in 1988, and since that time, no
title has been transferred, and no leases have been executed. Once again, the federal
government has ended up paying the maintenance bills, and the local communities
have seen no new jobs or tax revenues, and have spent significant time and money
in court. By most accounts, these cases represent impasses which resulted in lost
opportunities for the locals and ongoing costs for the U.S. taxpayer.
Ibid.
Most of the historical base disposal cases involve some level of "success" in
terms of federal and local objectives. In almost all situations, however, the local
interests must establish some level of cooperation and collaboration before effective
planning can occur. The federal procedures governing base disposal do not provide
many tools for multiparty decisionmaking at the local level.
The question then remains: Is there some way to better manage coordination
and avoid conflict? What planning tools are available to aid the local players in
reaching consensus? Finally, how can creative solutions be crafted in such a difficult
climate?
1.1 Consensus Building and Negotiation
As with other community planning cases, negotiation and bargaining are
always elements of this process. Yet, planning at this scale often requires more than
just give and take and political logrolling. In some difficult base reuse planning
cases, such as Hamilton and George, the need may exist for some level of mediation
or facilitation to bring the parties together. Perhaps a neutral, third party mediator
with expertise in conflicts of this type would be of some benefit.
The call for some form of consensus building in the base reuse planning seems
apparent. In all cases, especially where disputes seem likely, new prescriptions
appear warranted. If an impasse occurs among the local communities, and the
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process is in gridlock, as in the Hamilton and George cases, all parties are likely to
suffer the consequences.
This thesis focuses on the applicability of consensus building and mediated
negotiation in the military base reuse planning process. My hypothesis is that these
tools may be beneficial for the federal, state, and local authorities attempting to
establish a collaborative planning effort in the base disposal process.
In developing my ideas, I will first provide a brief synopsis of cases where
negotiation and consensus building have been employed to resolve public sector
disputes, including a case involving a military base closure. Additionally, I will
provide arguments for and against such an approach. The second chapter of the
thesis focuses on the laws and administrative procedures and regulations surrounding
base disposal activities, including a brief discussion on federal base closure "policies"
before and subsequent to the Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1988, and
additional detail regarding the Clinton Administration's new strategy. The next two
chapters provide actual case studies of the Hamilton AFB and George AFB cases,
with particular emphasis on the events surrounding the unresolved disputes. The fifth
chapter presents a critical analysis of these two cases in terms of where and why the
planning process went awry and an in what way the tools of negotiation and
consensus building might have been helpful. The final chapter focuses on lessons
learned from my research and analysis, including possible prescriptions for improving
the base disposal and reuse planning process.
1.2 The Call for Mediation
Mediated negotiation involves an informal, ad-hoc procedure where a neutral,
third party, with expertise in dispute resolution acts as an active facilitator. This
approach typically requires a party with specific knowledge of the issues. For
instance, in environmental disputes, an expert in environmental negotiation may be
warranted. Mediation is typically employed where unassisted negotiation has either
failed or is likely to fail. Base reuse planning may fall into either of these two
categories. Yet, how do we diagnose the problem to identify which approach to
take?
Mediated negotiation may be necessary in certain base reuse planning cases
for a number of reasons. In many of these cases, the parties involved have long
histories of conflict. Moreover, it is often difficult to find a neutral stakeholder to
facilitate the process and provide a reality check. The players involved may lack
good negotiating skills, placing them at a disadvantage in terms of building
consensus. Perhaps most problematic is the fact that the local participants in the
reuse planning endeavor have no models or systems to follow, thereby necessitating
some level of outside expertise.
As with other public disputes, the conflicts arising from community infighting
in base closures have a number of identifying characteristics. These include a
multiplicity of interests, varying levels of expertise, different power bases, varying
decisionmaking procedures, lack of standardized (formal) procedures, and a broad
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range of issues. " Other problem areas may also be present, such as a lack of long-
term commitment (as the players may feel that this will be the last time that they will
be required to work with the other parties), inequality in the voting process, complex
technical issues, and, perhaps the worst, the "winner-takes-all" mind-set." These
complexities may result in an impasse without some formal procedure for dispute
resolution. As such, mediation may be warranted.
1.3 Mediation in Land Use Disputes
The use of mediation in resolving land use disputes is not a new phenomenon.
Land use dispute resolution tools have been in place for close to two decades in some
form or another, and have been applied in major environmental, development, and
facility siting cases. The following paragraphs provide brief synopses of
representative cases where these techniques have been employed with some success.
1.3.1 Denver Metropolitan Water Roundtable
The Denver Metropolitan Water Roundtable case involved an eighteen month
negotiated effort involving the construction of a new dam in Colorado in the early
1980s. The endeavor began as a result of the complications of the previous dam
development in the area, which took 7 years of litigation, tripled the construction
10 Susan Carpenter and W.L.J. Kennedy, Managing Public Disputes, Jossey-Bass, London. 1988.
Susskind, Lawrence and Cruikshank, Jeffrey, Breaking The Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolvin
Public Disputes, (New York: Basic Books, 1987).
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costs, and polarized the community for close to a decade.'" After being asked to
intervene to assist in negotiations, the mediators involved in the case defined the real
question as "how can we best meet the water needs of the metropolitan Denver
area?""
The negotiations involved 31 different parties and required an eighteen month
effort. Sessions involved such activities as setting ground rules and protocols,
identifying and defining the different parties' interests, and joint fact-finding. During
the process, the 31 parties organized themselves into three groups, with each
developing their own set of proposals. According to the mediators involved in this
effort, the three parties focused on compromise and acceptance, versus positional
bargaining. The end result was a twelve-page agreement ratified by all parties,
followed by a careful implementation effort."
Although the issues involved in this case were somewhat different than the
typical base reuse planning scenario, the complexity of the problem, as well as the
way that the parties dealt with each other seem comparable.
12 "Denver Metropolitan Water Roundtable," Case Study Presented by Susan Carpenter, ACCORD
Associates, National Conference of State Legislatures Annual Meeting, Boston, July 22, 1984.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
1.3.2 The "Negotiated Investment Strategy"
One model of mediated negotiation which involves resolving jurisdictional
disputes similar to those found in military base disposal is the Negotiated Investment
Strategy (NIS). The NIS was designed to resolve disputes involving the need to
identify better ways of channelling federal funds to states and local communities.
The NIS approach is based on the assumption that decisions regarding the allocation
and use of public resources can be arrived at more efficiently if the following four
elements exist:
- All parties (in the process) participate;
- Different interests are represented by negotiating teams;
- The differences among the teams are identified through face-to-face
negotiation; and,
- A mediator is involved. 15
The NIS process is quite similar to many of the negotiation models used in
land use disputes, with the principal difference being that the NIS includes provisions
for public review and monitoring. This is necessitated by the fact that the NIS
involves so many different levels of government and numerous public participants.
Furthermore, results of NIS cases suggest that this approach has a number of key
success factors. These include:
- The need to encourage participation through positive incentives (access
to power) and negative case examples;
- Functioning in teams to meet political (need for representation) and
substantive (need for knowledge) objectives;
15 Carl M. Moore, "Negotiated Investment Strategy," Journal of Dispute Resolution, (January 1989).
- The need for adequate support staff and "stewards" (implementors);
and,
- Reasonable ground rules for the negotiations.' 6
In applying the NIS model to base disposal cases, it is important to recognize
a number of differences between traditional NIS applications and military installation
reuse planning. First, the NIS experiments typically involved fewer participants at
all levels of government. Secondly, the NIS model was designed principally for the
productive allocation of federal funds (generally perceived as a positive event)
whereas base disposal typically involves reuse planning where a major source of
employment has been lost. Finally, in the NIS cases, the BATNAs (Best Alternative
To a Negotiated Agreement)' 7 appeared to be no federal funds. In the case of base
disposal and reuse planning, the BATNAs are less clear. Even with these
differences, however, the NIS approach may provide useful parameters for
negotiating jurisdictional disputes associated with military base reuse planning.
1.4 The "Promise and the Pitfalls" of Mediation
Prior to embracing the principles of conflict resolution, most experts in this
field define where negotiation may or may not work. According to Susskind, the two
major categories of conflicts are distributional disputes and constitutional or legal
rights disputes. The first category focus on "the allocation of funds, the setting of
16 Ibid.
17 Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving
In (New York: Penguin Books, 1991).
standards, or the siting of facilities (including how we use our land and water).""8
Constitutional disputes deal primarily with interpretations of constitutionally
guaranteed rights.' 9
Base reuse planning involves a wide variety of legal and political issues, most
of which are what Susskind would define distributional in nature. Yet, some of the
issues in this process could arguably be constitutional or legal rights questions. For
instance, when the base closes and the land is surrounded by two or more
municipalities, and was never part of a specific municipality, should one town or city
be given the right to annex the base over another? This could be a question for the
courts.
In his essay Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Promise and the Pitfalls,
Douglas J. Amy argues both sides of the question of the use of dispute resolution.20
According to Amy, those who argue for dispute resolution often focus on the fact that
this approach is faster and cheaper than litigation, and that mediation focuses on
resolving the real (underlying) disputes, where litigation deals primarily with
questions of legal procedures and statutes. After all, argue the proponents, dispute
resolution is informal, and involves face-to-face discussions, thereby alleviating much
of the miscommunication and misperception which may exist without such tools.
18 Susskind and Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse, p. 17
19 Ibid.
20 Douglas J. Amy, "Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Promise and the Pitfalls," reprinted in
Environmental Policy in the 1990s, edited by Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft, (Washington D.C.:
CQ Press, 1990).
Finally, on the pro side, Amy points out that mediation focuses on win-win
situations, where all parties' concerns are treated as legitimate, and the mediator
attempts to structure creative compromises. Conversely, litigation typically has a
winner and a loser.21
Amy goes on to present a fairly comprehensive critique of dispute resolution
and mediation. He first argues that no real proof exists that dispute resolution is
faster or cheaper than litigation. According to Amy, most of the evidence is
anecdotal, and no systematic studies have been completed to prove that mediation
saves time or money in comparison to litigation. In fact, some have argued that
mediation may be more expensive, in that litigation often continues with mediation,
and mediation typically demands more research, which is expensive. Amy also
suggests that in a typical mediation case, access may not be the same for all parties
involved. Mediators make the decisions regarding what groups are included, and
they may try to limit the numbers to facilitate the process. Yet, according to Amy,
even with this access, an imbalance of power may exist. This inequity can take many
forms including different levels of negotiating experience, technical expertise, and/or
economic capabilities. One of Amy's more convincing arguments against mediation
involves his analysis of the assumptions made by dispute resolution advocates. For
instance, according to Amy, mediation proponents often argue that the interests of the
disputants are fundamentally compatible, and that the impasse has resulted from
misinformation, misrepresentation, and poor communication. Moreover, the
21 Ibid.
advocates suggest that all parties have equally valid concerns, and that compromise
is usually the best outcome. Opponents of mediation may disagree with these
assumptions, indicating that this approach is naive and misguided. After all, argues
this group, many of these conflicts are rooted in conflicts of principles and values.
Compromise may not be the answer in these situations. Most of all, according to
Amy, mediation may be viewed as misleading. It is not always the panacea that
some advocates might suggest.22
Both sides of the debate seem to agree that mediation has its limitations.
Many cases will not be resolved through this approach. According to the experts,
prior to entering into a formal negotiation process, it is important to recognize that
the success of this endeavor depends on a number of prerequisites, such as:
- Can the key players be identified and persuaded that it is in their best
interest to negotiate?
- Are the power relationships relatively balanced?
- Can a spokesperson(s) be located for each group?
- Do deadlines exist? Are they reasonable?
- Can the dispute be redefined so as to avoid any focus on constitutional
rights, cultural values, etc. ?23
- Will any of the parties benefit from some form of stalemate or delay?
22 Ibid.
23 Susskind and Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse.
Not all base disposal and reuse planning situations require assisted negotiation.
In fact, many of the base closure cases will not meet these tests. However, mediation
may prove to be an avenue for building consensus and cooperation. Conservatively
speaking, this strategy may provide an outlet for developing creative solutions to
difficult problems.
At least one case exists where mediation was used successfully to resolve a
base closure land use dispute. Although this closure occurred in the 1970s and dealt
primarily with environmental issues, it provides a valuable lesson for the application
of consensus building and negotiation in base reuse planning.
1.5 Mediation of a Military Base Disposal Dispute
In 1973, the Department of Defense closed several naval installations in Rhode
Island, totalling some 4,000 acres of property. To expedite the reuse of this excess
land, the GSA negotiated and executed leases with the Rhode Island Port Authority
and a number of private firms, including many oil-related companies. Environmental
groups concerned about these actions filed suit against the GSA for failing to follow
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) guidelines. This action eventually
escalated into a major land use dispute between environmental groups, the GSA, the
State of Rhode Island, and various private sector interests. Prolonged litigation
appeared inevitable."
24 Resolution of A Community Land Use Dispute: A Rhode Island Case Study, Community Guidance Manual
IV, The President's Economic Adjustment Committee, May 1980.
21
Hoping to avoid a prolonged conflict, in early 1977, the DOD and the State
decided to engage a non-profit, environmental mediation firm to assist in establishing
a forum for dispute resolution. The mediators spent the first few months identifying
the players to be involved in the negotiations. Close to 40 leaders from a wide
variety of interests first met formally to discuss, face-to-face, their concerns and
interests. As a result of the four years of intense conflict, the first meeting proved
to be a hostile session. As a result of this meeting and subsequent gatherings, the
mediator decided to establish a more informal setting, suggesting the creation of an
Executive Committee. The different parties endorsed this idea. This committee
became the driving force behind the development of a final agreement.
The mediations proved intense and time-consuming. Yet, by the end of 1978,
the parties came to agreement on such major issues as the environmental protection,
land parcel transfers, development rights, and worker occupational safety and health.
All players involved, even the most skeptical participants, endorsed the process and
the outcome. The success of this mediation has resulted in the establishment of a
similar Rhode Island State system. Furthermore, by most accounts, all players came
out ahead. The State and the DoD avoided costly litigation (estimated at $250,000,
compared to approximately $35,000 in mediation fees); the GSA was able to transfer
property, and forgo the costs of continued maintenance; environmental groups were
able to require key development limitations, with a continued threat of litigation if
the DoD and the State did not live up to their end of the agreement; and, private
industry was able to establish a new foothold in Rhode Island. 5
25 Ibid.
The results achieved in this case may not be achievable in all base disposal
disputes, as some of the conflicts may have vastly different characteristics. However,
it seems worth looking at mediation as one possible source of consensus building and
dispute resolution.
1.6 Federal Statutes Encouraging Negotiation
In an effort to encourage the use of negotiation and dispute resolution (as an
alternative to litigation), Congress has recently passed two pieces of legislation which
focus on consensual approaches to decisionmaking, the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act (1990) and the Negotiated Rulemaking Act (1990). According to
U.S. Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), chief sponsor of the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act in the Senate, the federal government is in an "ideal position to serve
as a beacon for the rest of our society" in the way that disputes are handled.26
Although the ADR Act does not specifically require the use of consensual approaches
in federal disputes, it provides guidance to federal agencies hoping to employ these
techniques. Furthermore, the Act directs federal agencies to consult on these matters
with the Administrative Conference of the U.S. (ACUS), the government group
responsible for this legislation.
The ADR Act provides a number of specific implementation provisions. The
legislation suggests that federal agencies consider, in coordination with the
26 Lawrence Susskind, Eileen F. Babbitt, and Phyllis Segal, "When ADR Becomes the Law," Negotiation
Journal, January 1993.
Administrative Conference, if ADR will be useful in their "administrative programs"
defined to include all activities involving "... protection of the public interest and
determination of rights..."27 In other words, the legislation encourages federal
agencies to undertake a proactive evaluation of where consensual approaches might
be employed. Additionally, the Act suggests that each federal agency select a "senior
official" to be that agency's dispute resolution specialist. This specialist should work
with agency counsel to incorporate specific dispute resolution approaches, such as
negotiation, mediation, facilitation, conflict assessment, and, in some cases,
arbitration (although this must be voluntary).2 8 Each of these approaches are
defined within the legislation. Once again, assistance is available through ACUS.
Although the ADR Act has not specifically been applied to base disposal
cases, it may have applicability in the future.29 Furthermore, a number of federal
agencies involved in base disposal, such as the EPA, Army Corps of Engineers,
Federal Aviation Administration and HHS, have been employing these techniques for
years. At first glance, it appears that these techniques could be applied in two
regards. First, the agencies integrally involved in base closure and disposal, could
employ methods identified and defined within the act (e.g. negotiation, facilitation,
mediation) to build consensus among the many players involved. For instance, where
the DoD and the OEA are beginning to work with a state and local communities to
27 Administrative Dispute Resolution Act [Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990)]
28 Ibid.
29 The U.S. Air Force Legal Office is currently evaluating the applicability of the ADR law to its disposal
cases.
initiate disposal actions and plan for reuse, they could employ an outside, objective
facilitator/mediator to assist in building a federal/state/local coalition. Secondly, the
Act seems well suited for distributional disputes which may arise in the process. For
instance, if a coalition has fallen apart over issues associated with differing reuse
planning interest, formal mediation may be appropriate. Clearly, this legislation is
no panacea for all disputes arising from base disposal actions. However, the ADR
Act does seem to offer some tools which may be useful in this complex process.
The following chapters provide case studies of base closure related land use
disputes which remain unresolved. In each of the cases, I will be examining the facts
and the chronology of events. With this information on the table, the final two
chapters will focus on what may have gone awry in these planning endeavors and
where mediation might have proved helpful.
CHAPTER 2 - THE BASE DISPOSAL PROCESS
2.0 Introduction
As indicated in the preceding chapter, the base disposal process is complex
and time consuming. This chapter focuses on the federal process in terms of its three
major components: federal property disposal procedures; environmental compliance
and remediation; and, the community planning effort. However, prior to detailing
the process surrounding base disposal, it is worth briefly reviewing the history of
military base closure and reuse.
2.1 History of Base Disposal
The closure of military bases is not a recent phenomenon. In fact, between
1961-1990, over 100 communities experienced military base closures and reuse
transitioning. Although this effort was not as extensive as the current round of
closures, it had significant social, political, and economic effects. According to the
Office of Economic Adjustment, the 100 communities involved lost over 93,000
civilian jobs, and approximately 137,000 military positions (although military jobs
are not calculated in the local employment figures). These job losses were partially
offset by over 158,000 new civilian jobs. Reuses for the closing installations
included office and industrial parks (at over 75 of the former bases), municipal and
general aviation airports (at 42 of the locations), and four-year and community
colleges. 30
30 Civilian Reuse of Former Military Bases, 1961-1990: Summary of Completed Military Base Economic
Adjustment Projects, Office of Economic Adjustment, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
(Washington, D.C. April-June 1990).
As noted in the previous chapter, prior to 1988, the General Services Agency
(GSA) was the federal government arm responsible for federal land disposition.3 1
The Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988 designated the Secretary of Defense
as the agency with responsibility for the disposal of excess military property. 2
Although this administrative change appeared inconsequential on the surface, it had
significant practical implications.
Prior to 1988, when the GSA "sold" federal property (e.g. military bases), the
proceeds of the sale would go into the federal Land and Conservation Fund,
ultimately ending up in the U.S. Treasury. As such, the GSA did not receive any
direct benefit from optimizing the value of the land (other than perhaps, a job well
done). Typically, because of the enormous political pressure that the GSA was
placed under in these cases, they would focus on public reuses and transfer of the
land through public benefit conveyances. However, the 1988 Act incentivized the
DoD in a different way. Under this legislation, the DoD was allowed to keep the
proceeds from the sale for internal requirements. Given the significant budget
pressures which DoD was facing, the department began focusing on optimizing "fair
market value" return. As a result, in their negotiations with states and communities,
they considered more than public uses. This change in philosophy had tremendous
procedural implications, as will be detailed later in this thesis.33
31 Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended [40 U.S.C. S 484].
32 Defense Reauthorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, as amended [Pub. L. No.
100-526, 102 Stat. 2623 (1988)]
See George R. Schlossberg, "Planning and Managing Military Base Adjustments: Federal, State and Local
Perspectives," Presentation at George Mason University Conference, January 23, 1992.
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2.2 The Players
In managing the process of disposing of excess military bases, the Secretary
of Defense has delegated his authority to the individual armed services. As such,
each of the military branches, Army, Navy and Air Force, has established a group
to control base disposal. Furthermore, in the 1960s, recognizing the need to provide
support to the communities affected by major federal agency employment actions, the
federal government established the Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA).
Organizationally, OEA falls under the Department of Defense, with a "dotted-line"
reporting relationship to the President's Economic Adjustment Committee.
In addition to the Department of Defense, a number of other federal agencies
and departments are typically involved in the disposal of a military base. For
instance, the following federal agencies are representative of the types of the branches
of government which might be involved in base closures and reuse planning
(depending on the proposed reuse).
- Department of Education (educational facilities)
- Department of Energy (utilities, nuclear power)
- Department of the Interior (parks, fish and wildlife)
- Department of Justice (prisons)
- Department of Transportation (highways, airports)
- Health and Human Services (mental health, homeless)
- Housing and Urban Development (housing)
- Environmental Protection Agency (federal environmental statutes)
Based on interviews with representatives from the Office of Economic Adjustment, March - June 1993.
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Additionally, because of the importance of military bases to state and regional
economies, in almost all cases, U.S. Congressional representatives are involved in
the disposal process. At the state and local levels, a variety of public and private
sector agencies involved, as well as special interest groups. For example, a typical
reuse effort might include the following interests:
- The State Legislature
- The Governor's Office
- State environmental agencies
- County and/or regional planning authorities
- Surrounding community planning authorities
- One or more public redevelopment authorities
- Citizens/neighborhood groups




This is certainly not all-inclusive list. Many more groups would be involved.
However, this sample serves to illustrate the complexity of the base disposal and
reuse planning collaboration. Moreover, as the following section illustrates, this
effort involves close coordination and cooperation among the federal, state and local
interests.
2.3 Federal Property Disposal Procedures
The following steps briefly outline the mechanics of the base disposal
process. 3
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended [40 U.S.C. S 484]; Defense
Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, supra.; McKinney Act: Public Health
and Welfare [42 U.S.C. S 11411]; Interviews with David A. MacKinnon, Office of Economic Adjustment,
March-June 1993.
1) Once the base has been selected and approved for closure, the disposal agency
begins the process by notifying the other military departments, Department of
Defense agencies, the U.S. Coast Guard, and Non-Appropriated Fund
Instrumentalities (NAFIs) of the availability of the property. This appears to
be somewhat of a formality as the Secretary of Defense would not likely
recommend the base for disposal if he felt that it could be reutilized within the
DoD. If no other DoD organization requests use of the property, the base is
determined to be excess to defense needs.
2) Before the base is offered to the state and local governments, the land must
be screened for use by other federal agencies. Simultaneously, the base is
screened for reuse under the guidelines of the McKinney Act. Each of these
screening processes is presented separately as follows:
The federal agency screening requires a 30-60 day clearance process.
During this time, any federal agency is permitted to request the land.
In so doing, the agency must pay a "fair market value" for the
property (as determined by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB)). However, the fair market value requirement can be waived
under of a variety of circumstances. For instance, if an agency such
as the National Park Service requests the land for public use, it is
unlikely that they will be required to pay fair market value for the
parcel. As mentioned previously in this paper, a wide variety of
federal agencies are involved in this and later stages. Moreover, as
a practical matter, almost any federal agency can request the land at
any time during the disposal process. Finally, many federal agencies
act as agents for local communities, requesting the land for such uses
as affordable housing, education, and prisons.
The second component of the federal clearance process is review of
the property for use under the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless
Assistance Act. Two federal agencies are involved in this process, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). This process
involves advertising the availability of the base to various homeless
provider agencies via the federal register and direct mail (to the larger
homeless providers). Prior to notification, HUD will look at the base
in terms of its suitability in accordance with the Act. If the base is not
feasible in this regard, HUD will likely suggest that it not be
considered for use by homeless providers. However, if it is
determined suitable for use under the McKinney Act, as noted above,
it will be advertised; according to the act, interested groups have 90
days to respond to the request; HHS will review all proposals to
determine the capabilities of the providers. In this analysis, HHS is
looking primarily at the financial and service capabilities of the
groups. If approved by HHS, the proposal will be forwarded to the
disposal agency for issuance of a lease.
3) Once the federal agency and McKinney Act clearances are complete, and, if
none of these departments are interested in the base property, the land, or
remaining portion thereof, is determined to be surplus to the federal
government.
4) At this stage, the land is offered to the state and local governments via either
public benefit conveyances or negotiated sales. A public benefit conveyance
is a transfer of property from the federal government to the state or local
government (or their representatives) based on the "best interests of the
federal government, " at some discount to fair market value (up to 100 percent
discount). Negotiated sales involve some type of negotiations between the
federal government and the state or local communities. However, prior to
any transfer of property, the disposal agency must complete an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) and, based on the outcome of the EIS and
coordination with the local agencies, a Property Disposal Plan (PDP).
Realistically speaking, by this time, the state and local governments will likely
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have marshalled their resources into one or more agencies to manage the base
reuse planning process. As such, the federal disposal agency will likely be
working closely with the local agencies to coordinate the EIS and PDP
actions. The EIS and PDP processes are presented briefly in the following
subparagraphs.
The EIS is designed to be a decision guidance document for the
federal disposal agency to use in their Property Disposal Plan. It
should address issues regarding the quality and potential reuses of the
existing land and what factors are impediments to the effective
disposal. Much of the document deals with the environmental aspects
of the reuse. However, this product provides much more than just
environmental guidance. The EIS process is managed by the base
disposal agency and is monitored by the EPA. The EIS is completed
by a private contractor and is typically very time consuming. Once
the Draft EIS is complete, the disposal agency must organize a public
hearing and present the EIS findings. This hearing will typically be
held at a meeting facility in one of the affected communities (however,
not on the base). The disposal agency is responsible to ensure that all
affected parties are invited. Once the draft hearing is complete, then
any concerned group has 45 days to provide comments to the disposal
agency. The agency must "address" these comments and regardless
of whether or not they agree, they must respond to any issues of
concern. Once all comments have been addressed, the disposal agency
has 30 days to publish the final report. This final EIS is then
registered as a Record of Decision (ROD). A ROD has important
legal implications as it represents documented findings regarding
environmental compliance on the site, as well as the federal
government's plan for disposition of the property. Once the EIS is
complete, the disposal agency must develop the PDP.
The Property Disposal Plan (PDP) is based on the outcome of the EIS
and should also consider the reuse plans of the local agencies. This
document is designed to be a disposition plan and should answer
questions relating to whom land should be transferred, how much land
should be involved in each transaction, when land should change
hands, and in what forms (e.g. sold, leased, conveyed, etc.). The
disposal agency may have difficulty in developing the PDP as much
of the PDP work is occurring simultaneously with the EIS research
and work being performed by the local redevelopment agency and
other interested parties. As such, from a pragmatic standpoint, the
disposal agency must work closely with the local agencies to develop
a coordinated plan ( and to avoid the "them" vs. "us" stigma).
Once the EIS and PDP are complete (at least in some preliminary form) the
federal government "officially" begins to work on the property transfer
actions through negotiated sales, leases, and/or public benefit conveyances
(PBC). The communities and state identify desired properties, and the federal
government begins hard negotiations with the local participants. This process
is likely to be very time consuming, often involving years of complex
transactions.
5) Any land remaining from the process outlined above is then offered for sale
via a public bidding process.
2.4 Environmental Aspects of the Base Disposal Process
Federal and state environmental statutes and regulations have a significant
impact on base closure and reuse planning. Environmental actions associated with
base disposal follow two distinct processes. The first component, the Environmental
Impact Analysis Procedure (EIAP) focuses on evaluating the environmental effects
of proposed (alternative) uses. The second set of procedures deals with the cleanup
and remediation of existing hazardous waste. Although these procedures and
statutory guidelines were not designed specifically for base transitioning actions, they
have been interpreted and amended to apply to all DoD disposal cases.
This section briefly describes both environmental processes and their effect
on the base disposal process. More specifically, I will identify the most relevant
environmental statutes, how these statutes affect base reuse, and the interaction
between the two major players involved in environmental compliance and
remediation: the Department of Defense, and the Environmental Protection Agency.
Finally, I will provide an update on current DoD/EPA "partnership" efforts.
2.4.1 The Environmental Impact Analysis Process
The Environmental Impact Analysis Process (EIAP) is directed for all federal
agencies under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1970.36 NEPA
was designed to provide an "impact statement" approach to regulating the activities
of federal agencies. More specifically, the Act provides that any legislation or other
"major federal action" undertaken by a federal agency must be accompanied by a
detailed statement regarding the effect of the proposed action on the "human
environment."3 7 Furthermore, NEPA requires the responsible agency to consider
alternatives to the proposed action. As a practical matter, this process has a major
effect on the disposal of military installations. For instance, a typical base disposal
case will involve a minimum of two (and often three or more) comprehensive
Environmental Impact Statements (EIS). The first EIS will be for closure (CEIS),
and will focus on short-term closure planning actions. The second EIS will focus on
various reuse scenarios for the base property. This EIS is often time consuming and
expensive.
36 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) [Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970)]
37 Ibid.
The following points present a brief overview of the environmental impact analysis
process.38
1) Stage one of obtaining an EIS involves soil sampling and data collection.
This entails reviewing historical records, as well as physical inspection of the
property, both visually and through soil samples.
2) A description of the proposed action and potential alternative uses planned for
the site is then drafted. This section discusses the impacts likely to result
from the proposed action and alternatives, complete with methods for
mitigating such impacts.
3) The proposed action and potential planned uses are then matched to the
environmental analysis, with the resulting data then compared to the local
community's reuse plan.
4) All of the data, proposals and mitigation methods are then combined to form
the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS). Often this is completed
in two stages with a preliminary DEIS first being circulated before the final
DEIS is written.
5) A local public hearing is then held to address the DEIS. This public hearing
also begins a 45 day statutory period for public comments on the DEIS.
6) The public comments are then comprehensively addressed, culminating into
a Final EIS. Often a preliminary FEIS will be completed and reviewed to
insure that all public concerns, comments, and mitigation measures were
effectively addressed.
7) Finally, the EIS is recorded to become a permanent Record of Decision
(ROD). This has lasting and binding implications, since it creates a public,
legal record of contamination levels, remedial action, future uses, mitigation
measures and a review of the public comments and concerns.
2.4.2 Base Cleanup and Remediation
Each military base was designed to include its' own infrastructure, which in
essence makes the base almost completely self contained. As a result, military bases
have been able to function as mini-cities, usually even complete with their own utility
38 Interview with Johanna Hunter, Regional Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, Boston, April
1993.
sources. Understanding this point helps demonstrate how and why most military
bases have developed numerous hazardous waste contaminated areas. The most
common hazards include petroleum, cleaning solvents, heavy metals and PCBs.
The majority of these hazards exist on military bases today because of
historical operations on the installations. Each base typically has a motor pool, and
repair and maintenance areas for equipment and aircraft. These areas are generally
contaminated with petroleum products. The petroleum contamination has resulted
from problems such as leaking underground tanks that have not been maintained, fuel
and oil spills, as well as improperly dumped motor oil. Some of the worst petroleum
contamination is found at the base locations where fire training drills have been
repeatedly conducted over the years. These practice drills usually involved igniting
fuel that was then contained and extinguished. And as a result, unburned fuel would
be absorbed into the soil.
Most bases also have hazardous sites caused by ordnance storage and disposal
areas. Additionally, the self-contained base infrastructure includes additional
environmental hazards such as landfills that were created as base garbage dumps, as
well as base waste treatment, discharge and disposal systems.
Due to the types of activities conducted on them over the years, most military
installations have some level of contamination which must be remediated. If the
situation is severe, the base will have been placed on the National Priority List
(NPL). NPL designation carries certain advantages, such as increased support and
36
federal funding. However, this characterization also results in a heightened level of
scrutiny and additional procedural requirements. More specifically, in the disposition
process, NPL sites are required to have an Inter-Agency Agreement (IAG). The IAG
is a compact between the DoD, EPA, and sometime the state environmental agency
which guides remediation actions and establishes schedules for remediation.39
Under the "superfund" laws, if EPA and DoD cannot agree on the remediation
strategy, EPA will select the remedy."4
In the case of either an NPL site or a non-NPL site, certain procedures must
be followed. The following points outline the principal actions required.
1) The first stage involves the preliminary assessment and physical inspection of
the site. This stage is identical to the first step of the EIS process, which
entails reviewing historical records, as well as physical inspection of the
property.
2) The second stage involves conducting remedial investigations and feasibility
investigations (RI/FI) on these potential remedial actions.
3) The third stage includes beginning the implementation of, as well as finalizing
plans for, all interim and final remediation strategies.
4) The fourth stage involves full site characterization of contamination levels, so
as to classify the contaminated site according to cost-to-correct and clean-up
priority.
39 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).
* Ibid.
In addition to the procedures outlined above, under CERCLA, the DoD
agency responsible for disposing of the excess property must serve notice to the
future user(s)/owner(s) regarding historical contamination. Further, DoD must
"indemnify" the end user. Specifically, in the transfer documents, in considering the
proposed use(s), the disposal agency must include covenants that all required remedial
actions have been taken and that the U.S. government retains responsibility for any
future required remediation actions.41 Additionally, prior to recent legislation, the
DoD could not transfer any parcels of property until the entire installation was clean.
In the first two rounds of base closure (and the associated reuse planning), the
DoD and the EPA have found it difficult to both adhere to federal environmental
legislation and meet the needs of the local community in expediting the transfer of
base property. Recognizing this problem, in 1992, the Congress passed the
Community Environmental Response Facilitation Act (CERFA). CERFA amends
previous legislation in an effort to facilitate base closure and reuse.4 2 In a practical
sense, in conjunction with the EPA, CERFA directs federal agencies to identify
uncontaminated parcels early in the disposal process. Furthermore, the Act allows
for the expeditious transfer of uncontaminated and remediated parcels. To encourage
timely transfer, the legislation sets deadlines for these actions. Finally, CERFA
allows for transfer of federal property during the remediation process if an approved
remedy has been developed and approved by the EPA.43
41 Ibid.
42 Community Environmental Response Facilitation Act (CERFA) [Pub. L. 102-426, 106 Stat. 2174 (1992)]
4 Ibid.
2.4.3 Recent DoD/EPA Joint Efforts
Recognizing the need to improve coordination between the federal agencies
on the environmental component of the base disposal process, as well as the
requirement to balance environmental protection with economic development, the
Clinton Administration has encouraged an active "partnership" between the
Department of Defense and the Environmental Protection Agency." In essence,
these two agencies have suggested that their goal is to streamline the process without
compromising the substance of the environmental protection provisions.45
Specifically, in recent Congressional testimony, these agencies outlined four specific
actions which they planned to take to improve the process of disposing of military
bases. First, they plan to improve coordination between the cleanup and reuse
efforts. In other words, where feasible, focus the cleanup and remediation strategy
on the parcels which have been identified for early reuse. Second, the DoD and EPA
plan to follow and enforce the provisions of CERCLA (outlined previously). Third,
these two agencies indicated a desire to support the recent CERFA legislation.
Finally, where feasible, the Administration officials suggested that their agencies will
expedite the transfer of military base land from the federal government to the local
communities.46
" Joint Statement of Sherri Wasserman Goodman, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental
Security) and Thomas L. McCall, Jr., Acting Deputy Administrator for Federal Facilities, U.S.




The impact of these proposed policy changes could be dramatic. One of the
major difficulties that communities face in this process is property transfer in the face
of stringent environmental laws and regulations. The proposed DoD/EPA partnership
could partially alleviate some of these difficulties by focusing their efforts on quick
reuse of economically desirable property. For example, if the proposed reuse of and
industrial area is an industrial park, remediation should focus on meeting this need,
as opposed to cleaning to a residential standard. The implementation of the
Administration's new procedures remains to be seen. However, these policy shifts
should yield positive effects.
2.5 Community Planning
The third concurrent process involved in base disposition involves the
community reuse planning effort. Although not recognized as such by most federal
government officials, in many ways, this component of base disposal is the most
important. Consider the following:
- In most base closure cases, the local community is responsible for
establishing a reuse planning agency and developing a reuse master
plan.
- Because of the sheer size of most military bases, as well as the
significant environmental compliance efforts required prior to full
reuse, the DoD must look to the local public sector as the receiver of
much of the land.
- Federal disposition guidelines favor transfer to local communities.
Given these circumstances, as well as historical precedent, the local communities will
play a large role in the disposal of former military bases. Furthermore, in cases
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involving major regional economic impact, state authorities have stepped in to assist
in or manage reuse planning."
As noted previously, the federal government agency most responsible for
providing assistance to the local communities is the Office of Economic Adjustment
(OEA). OEA will typically act as an advisor to the local community in the reuse
planning effort as well as a coordinating group for dealing with other federal
agencies. Further, the OEA provides grant money for reuse planning.48
Once a military base is identified for closure, the affected state or local
communities will likely begin organizing to address reuse planning. This activity is
encouraged by the federal government as no property can effectively be transferred
without some form of local input and land use regulation. In meeting with the state
and local authorities, the DoD makes it clear that their desire is to work with one
reuse planning group/redevelopment agency. Although this is not official policy,
informally, the DoD can encourage such an approach. For instance, the Office of
Economic Adjustment will typically provide only one planning grant (or multiple
grants to one group). 49 Additionally, the DoD disposal agency can decide to accept
one community's plan over another (as the preferred plan). However, the statutes
and regulations devote little mention of these potential problems, and the federal
4 The most illustrative case of this is the Massachusetts Government Land Bank and their role in the planning
for the reuse of Fort Devens in Ayer, Massachusetts.
48 Defense Economic Adjustment Programs [Executive Order No. 12049, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1978), reprinted in
10 U.S.C. S 111 notes (Supp. 1992)].
49 Interview with Kenneth Matzkin, Office of Economic Adjustment, Washington, D.C., June 8, 1993.
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agencies involved are reluctant to place themselves in the middle of a jurisdictional
dispute between two or more communities.
In most cases, either the state and/or the municipalities will form some type
of development/redevelopment authority to manage the base disposal process at the
local level. This agency works closely with the federal government agencies in order
to expedite the property transfer process, as well as to protect the interests of the
local community. Additionally, at some point, this group will begin to market the
installation to prospective local, national, or international users. The prevailing
conventional wisdom surrounding base closures does not advocate any one type of
redevelopment organization. In some cases, the state will assume control through
enabling legislation or gubernatorial (executive) order. Whereas, in other situations,
the local communities will join forces to form their own reuse planning group.
2.6 The Clinton Administration Strategy
On July 2, 1993, in approving the 1993 Base Closure Commission's
recommendations, President Clinton presented a new $5.0 billion, five-point plan for
overhauling the base adjustment process. The plan is designed to shift greater
priority towards community economic development. Specifically, the plan calls for
the following:
- Changes in federal disposal laws and procedures which permit public
benefit conveyances. The current laws do not allow PBCs for
economic development. The Clinton proposal seeks to change these
laws to allow the DoD to turn over property for economic
development, as long as the community plan meets certain
requirements.
- Improved access to transition assistance. The strategy calls for
increased funding and administrative streamlining of transition
assistance programs.
- A new "fast-track cleanup" program, that eliminates unnecessary
delays (while maintaining environmental protection), will be
implemented. Much of this effort will be accomplished by sending
special teams to each base to identify clean parcels (for immediate
reuse) and expediting the cleanup process.
- Placing transition coordinators at each base. The Clinton plan
suggests that the federal government will soon be sending "transition
coordinators" to each base to assist the local players in cutting through
the red tape and acting as the "community champion."
- Increased economic development assistance will soon be made
available. The proposed strategy includes greater and more
expeditious funding for local community planning and economic
development.50
This policy shift indicates that the Clinton Administration is well aware of
many of the major issues affecting base reuse planning. Further, the President's
proposal suggests that he will be directing more effort and funding towards
community needs, as opposed to federal disposition procedures. This appears to be
more of a "partnership" or a "transition assistance" approach rather than the historical
"disposition" strategy. The question is now whether the Administration will be able
to marshall Congressional support and approval. If he is successful in this regard,
the next hurdle will be to implement these changes at the local level. Key questions
remain, such as:
- How will these new federal benefits be delivered to the local
communities? Who will be the recipients of the funds?
50 White House Press Release, "Revitalizing Base Closure Communities," July 2, 1993.
- How much authority will the "transition coordinators" have? Will
they be able to grant money and recommend public benefit
conveyances? To whom do they report?
- What tests will the local communities have to meet to receive public
benefit land transfers? Can more than one community receive
financial and other forms of federal support?
Clearly, these are difficult questions which are likely already being debated
in Washington. The questions as they relate to this thesis are: How do we ensure
that local consensus is reached before (or, as) the federal authorities deliver these
new benefits? And, how do communities facing these complex federal procedures
marshall a collaborative planning effort?
CHAPTER 3 - THE HAMILTON EXPERIENCE
3.0 Introduction
The implementation of the base disposal/reuse planning process at the local
level often coincides with other major land use policy debates. Such is the case with
the Hamilton AFB closure. Hamilton is located in Marin County, a wealthy
suburban area north of San Francisco. The base was first announced for closure in
April 1973, when the Air Force determined that the land was excess to their needs.
The closure came at a time when Marin County, in the face of rapid development,
was working to resolve the need for a controlled growth plan for the area. Marin's
strategy was essentially a slow-growth strategy. The debate was perhaps best framed
by the GSA in their EIS comments:
Both the City of Novato and Marin County are very
concerned about the current economic and demographic
trends of the area. The urban corridor of Marin
County, extending along Highway 101 from the Marin
headlands north to and into Sonoma County
increasingly functions as a bedroom suburb for the
affluent employed in San Francisco. Commuter traffic
is rapidly congesting Highway 101. Opportunity for
further residential development is decreasing, and
housing costs are driving lower-, moderate- and even
middle-income residents out of the County. Job
opportunities within the County are limited, and little
basic industry exists."
51 U.S. General Services Administration, "Final EIS on Disposition and Use of Federal Property at Hamilton
Air Force Base," February 1980.
The closure also occurred in the midst of a debate over the need for expanded
airport services in Marin and the greater San Francisco Bay Area. The result was
a series of disputes, carried on for close to twenty years, between advocates for
regional aviation and those who essentially took a slow or no development stance.
During this period, for the most part, the federal government was left holding and
maintaining the property.
The following paragraphs provide an overview of the Hamilton experience in
terms of the players, the chronology of events, and the disputes which erupted
between the various interests. All of this is intended as background material to the
question of whether or not this case could have been different with some explicit
consensus building early in the process.
3.1 The Context
Hamilton is located on the shore of San Pablo Bay in Novato, a city with
approximately 35,000 residents in 1973, some 25 miles north of San Francisco in
Marin County. The county is best characterized as a wealthy suburban area, with a
population of over 200,000 (1973 figures) and one of the highest median incomes in
the U.S. Hamilton AFB is a relatively small installation by Department of Defense
standards. In 1973, when the base was declared excess, the base was comprised of
2,127 acres of land and improvements, with a population of approximately 2,000
military and 600 DoD Civilian personnel.s 2
52 Office of Economic Adjustment, "Status Report: Hamilton Air Force Base," Washington, D.C. June 1976.
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The base is situated at the interface between San Pablo Bay and the hilly
uplands of Marin County. Much of the base, including the runway and its supporting
environs, is located in lowlands in the Novato Creek bay plain that have been
reclaimed from bay tidelands. These parcels are as much as 6.5 feet below mean sea
level, subject to tidal flooding, and are protected by a series of levees and pumps.
The other portions of the base are comprised of low hills and uplands. Marin County
is located in an earthquake zone.53
As with most military installations, the base is a self-contained community.
Land uses include an 8,000-foot runway, with hangars and support buildings, office
areas, three housing areas, a community support district, and a golf course. The base
is located wholly within the City of Novato (although it was never annexed by the
City) in Marin County, with simple and direct access to State Highway 101. Because
of the physical characteristics outlined above, and the fact that Hamilton's runway is
built to military specifications, most experts agree that it would be cumbersome and
very costly to use the aviation area of the base for anything other than an airport.
Some land, however, is available for residential, commercial and industrial
54development."
" U.S. General Services Administration, "Final EIS on Disposition and Use of Federal Property at Hamilton
Air Force Base," February 1980.
54 Ibid.
3.2 The 1973 Closure Action and Its Aftermath
The Department of Defense restructuring during the early 1970s resulted in
a number of base closures throughout the continental U.S., including Hamilton Air
Force Base. In April 1973, the Air Force announced that they intended to remove
all active units from the base by January 1974. Although no official announcement
was made regarding disposition of the property, it quickly became clear that
Hamilton's days as an active military base were numbered. Immediately subsequent
to the announcement, the communities surrounding the base, including representatives
from Marin County and Novato, jointly formed ad-hoc citizens committees to study
the reuse potential of the installation. During this same time frame, based on internal
defense screening activities, the Air Force transferred 1,197 housing units, various
community support facilities, and 460 acres of land to the Navy for use as a defense
housing project for the San Francisco area. Additionally, the Army was deeded the
base hospital and 10 acres of land for use as a Reserve Center.55
The Air Force made its final decision to close the base in November 1974,
and by March 1975 reported 1,400 acres to the GSA as excess to defense needs
(presumably some land was held in reserve for other defense uses). Screening by
other federal agencies occurred between March 1975 and early 1976. As a result,
approximately 200 acres of the land was "tentatively" reserved for inclusion in the
National Wildlife Refuge System, 55 acres and 5 buildings abutting the flight line
OEA, "Status Report: Hamilton Air Force Base," 1976.
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were identified for joint use by the Coast Guard and Army, and 2 buildings were set
aside for the FAA (assuming future aviation uses). In March 1976, the remaining
1,145 acres were determined to be surplus property, and approximately 1,055 acres
were made available for "public airport purposes."16 This definition meant that the
land could be transferred via public benefit conveyance at a steep discount (up to 100
percent) to fair market value. Moreover, the federal authorities seemed to be
encouraging this approach.
During the federal screening period, the communities were preparing their
reuse plans. In November 1975, the City of Novato held a referendum on the issue
of aviation with two different measures. The first measure would have created a
general aviation zone in Novato; while the second measure would have applied this
zone to Hamilton. Both measures were defeated by a sizeable majority." Within
a year of this vote, the Marin County Board of Supervisors, in a departure from
Novato, unanimously endorsed limited aviation activity and notified the GSA of their
intention to apply for acquisition of the surplus property for an airport facility. This
placed the county and Novato at odds with each other, with Novato advocating "no
aviation" and Marin County suggesting some limited aviation use.
56 Ibid.
"7 Hamilton Reuse Committee, "Comprehensive Land Use Plan-Hamilton Army Airfield, " November 7, 1991.
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Between April and June 1976, presumably when Marin was developing its
application for purchase, based on federal agency screening, the GSA determined
that, of the land held in reserve (the property not included in the 1,055 acre public
airport transfer parcel), approximately 18 acres should be improved and reused for
moderate income housing, 15 acres and the DoD school buildings would be
transferred to the Novato School system, 66 acres would be set aside for public park
and recreation uses, and the remaining property should be made available for
reasonable and controlled industrial, commercial, and community development.58
The County proposal for the acquisition and redevelopment was submitted in
mid-1976 and focused on the reuse of the base for a limited aviation airport and
controlled industrial development. At this point, Novato was participating solely as
an "observer." Marin's plan included the following provisions:
- To "acquire" as soon as feasible, but no later than July 1977, all of
the surplus property for use as a public airport at a 100 percent
discount to value.59
- Relocate all municipal airport activities to the base from Gnoss Field
(the county airport) and to close Gnoss Field as an aviation activity.
- Support relocation of the Coast Guard aviation activities from the San
Francisco International Airport to the base. Although the Coast Guard
would control its own compound within the base, it would reimburse
the County for use of the runway and aviation support facilities.
Furthermore, with this move, the Army flying mission would become
a tenant of the Coast Guard.
58 Ibid.
59 The federal government's suggestion that the land is being "acquired" at a "100 discount to value" suggests
that they are not in the business of giving away property for free.
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- Severely limit the aviation activities, prohibiting all commercial
aircraft except small commuter airplanes.
- Acquire and develop, in a controlled manner, non-aviation related
property to support the phased development of the airport.
The major federal players involved in the process, including the Air Force, the FAA,
EDA, the Coast Guard, and the U.S. Army, all seemed amenable to this plan.
However, Novato made it clear that they were against aviation."
Between 1976 and 1979, while the federal government was completing the
EIS, the mood in Marin County appeared to be changing. Because of the heated
debate surrounding the reuse of the base as an airport, in 1979, the Marin County
Board of Supervisors placed 4 measures addressing Hamilton on the ballot. The first
measure would prohibit the County from spending money to improve or operate
Hamilton air facilities. The second measure focused on the development of Hamilton
into an energy efficient community, not including an airport. The third measure
would require the County to take over Hamilton and develop it with limited aviation
(which could include aircraft that could carry up to 20 passengers). The last measure
would require the County to acquire Hamilton and develop it for general aviation
purposes, that could include West Coast passenger services. All four measure were
soundly defeated. 61 The results do not suggest that Marin voters were against
aviation. Rather, they indicate that the County should not be required to reuse
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
Hamilton in this manner. Furthermore, the voters did not preclude the County from
spending public funds to improve or operate the airfield. As a result of these
referendums, in May 1979, the County pulled its application for acquisition of
Hamilton AFB.
In 1980, the County held another referendum on the Hamilton airport issue.
This measure would have required the county to move the regional airport from
Gnoss Field to Hamilton. The voters rejected this idea. That same year, the GSA
published the final EIS for the reuse. The FEIS generally recommended a public
airport use, although other considerations were evaluated, such as residential,
commercial/industrial use, "public service activities," and "no action" or land
banking.62
The FEIS comments indicated a number of interesting attitudes surrounding
reuse planning. First, it was clear from the documents that the airport debate was
not simply a local issue. More specifically, The FAA and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (Department of the Interior) sparred over the need for aviation vs. wildlife
habitats on the former base. The FAA indicated that they could live with the existing
habitat uses on the base, but rejected expansion of these areas if civil aviation use
was approved. The Fish and Wildlife Service was more direct, requesting that the
GSA not approve the civil aviation use (due to the need for expand habitated
62 GSA, "Final EIS on Disposition and Use of Federal Property at Hamilton Air Force Base," February 1980.
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areas).63 This federal level debate only served to further complicate reuse planning
at the local level.
The conclusions reached by GSA reveal that battle lines had formed over the
aviation use:
... opinion in the county appears strongly divided for
and against general aviation uses at Hamilton, and
significantly less support exists for commercial air
carrier use. Those opposing public aviation uses will
probably mount a major effort in opposition to any
decision to dispose of the property for a public airport.
Similarly, pro-aviation groups will oppose any disposal
precluding aviation use..."
As Marin backed off on its advocacy for an aviation reuse, regional interests
joined the fray, with an interest in both accommodating area aviation needs, and
environmental protection (from a regional perspective). Two groups were prominent
in this debate, the Bay Area Regional Airport Planning Committee (RAPC), and the
Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC). Both groups were
essentially advocating aviation use at Hamilton, due to the need to expand area
airports. Also of concern was the impact on the region if Hamilton was not reused
for this purpose. BCDC argued that if this was the case, the San Francisco or
Oakland Airports would require expansion, resulting in the need to fill parts of the
bay, with adverse environmental consequences. As such, both groups opposed non-




By the early 1980s, Marin County and Novato were fundamentally in
agreement regarding the airport use. Both groups had rejected commercial air carrier
use in their community plans. The difference was that Marin left the door open for
limited aviation use (although the Board of Supervisors did not openly endorse
aviation uses at Hamilton). In an effort to identify other uses, the County and
Novato supported what came to be defined as the "balanced community" plan. This
plan called for Hamilton to be developed with pollution-free industry which was less
dependent on a resident workforce commuting to San Francisco, and which
minimized traffic and related environmental impacts. The plan also suggested the
need to meet low and moderate income housing needs. Yet, these proposals lacked
specific suggestions for implementation, and failed to identify any associated
employment sources.
By 1984, little had been accomplished in the disposition of Hamilton AFB,
and the airport issue again came to a vote in the City of Novato. In this round, the
City proposed a new ordinance severely limiting aviation uses and suggested reusing
the base as a joint use military/civil general aviation airport. Under the proposed
ordinance, civil general aviation would restrict use of the facilities for air carrier, air
taxi or commuter operations. Furthermore, severe limits would be placed on noise,
flight paths, hours of operation, and takeoff and landing patterns. Finally, the
initiative indicated that Novato would "negotiate agreements with airport users to
ensure that the City would be reimbursed or indemnified for 100 percent of its costs
for the acquisition, development, maintenance, operation, management, and control
of the airport." 66 The question was put to a vote as follows:
"Environmental Assessment and Environmental Impact Report on Joint Military/Civilian General Aviation
Use of Hamilton Army Airfield, Novato, California," Turner Collie & Braden, Inc., October 19, 1984.
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Do the people of the City of Novato desire Hamilton
Air Force Base to be used for civil general aviation
purposes consistent with and subject to the conditions
imposed by the City's Ordinance Initiative governing
such use? 67
This proposal was very similar to what Marin County had proposed back in 1976,
although the Novato plan placed greater constraints on aviation uses. In the
November general election, the voters of Novato rejected the initiative, with close to
60 percent voting against the proposed aviation use.68
As a result of this indecision and inaction, in 1984, the GSA transferred
approximately 980 acres of the property (essentially the surplus land) to the U.S.
Army for Reserve Component use. Hamilton AFB was officially renamed Hamilton
Army Airfield.
3.3 Referendums and Initiatives in the Base Reuse Planning Process
As is evident in the Hamilton AFB case, placing issues associated with base
reuse planning on the ballot seems problematic in a number of ways. Planning for
the redevelopment of a large, self-contained community is complex and, in many
regards, involves highly technical issues. Condensing these elements into ballot
questions is practically impossible. Consider Marin County's ballot questions
67 Ibid.
68 "Comprehensive Land Use Plan - Hamilton Army Airfield," November 7, 1991.
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concerning the reuse of Hamilton. In all of the elections, this issue essentially boiled
down to a question about reusing Hamilton for an airport. The voters of Marin were
asked simply if they wanted an airport in their back yard. They predictably rejected
this notion. Yet, in a regional sense, this issue is more complex. The regional
planners (BCDC, etc.) are faced with the issue of either reusing Hamilton or
expanding Gnoss Field, which would necessitate filling in wetlands; or, worse yet,
filling in part of San Francisco Bay to expand the San Francisco or Oakland Airports.
Thus, if the voters of Marin County were asked if they prefer reusing Hamilton for
an airport or expanding Gnoss Field (requiring filling a wetlands area), the result may
have been altogether different.
Another major problem with referendums is that they are generally worded
to elicit a specific response. For instance, the 1979 and 1980 Marin County ballot
questions ask if the voters would require the County to redevelop Hamilton for
aviation uses. Not surprisingly, the voters overturned these proposals. But, what if
the questions had focused on allowing the County to reuse Hamilton for aviation if
required.
In the case of the City of Novato, the issues are even more complex. Should
the City of Novato be able to vote on an issue which is regional in scope? More
specifically, if additional airport facilities are required in Marin County, is it
reasonable for the residents of Novato to make this decision? This is not a question
which is easy to answer. But at a minimum, it seems inappropriate to place these
issues on the ballot.
The public clearly has a right to have a voice in the base reuse planning
process. Elected officials and public hearings seem well suited for this purpose.
Yet, use of the referendums and initiative will, in most cases, be a poor tool for
deciding these vexing issues.
3.4 The 1988 Closure
In late 1988, approximately 710 acres of Hamilton Army Airfield (HAAF)
(essentially, the airfield portion of the base) were identified by the Base Closure
Commission to be excess to defense needs, and in the summer of 1989, what
remained of the installation was officially placed on the base closure list. 69 In the
same year, the Hamilton Reuse Committee was formed, with representation from pro-
aviation constituencies from Marin County. The HRC was an unofficial, ad-hoc
citizens group, with representation from business and community leaders throughout
Marin County. As such, this committee was not formed under any special
government authority.
This closure action resurrected many of the same issues which had been faced
in the previous debates. But, in this round, Novato and Marin officials were more
clearly in agreement in their opposition to airport use. As the events unfolded in this
round, it became evident that the voters of Marin were against any type of
development.
69 Ibid.
In June 1989, just prior to the official closure, Novato citizens had rejected
a plan for a large-scale residential development on approximately 450 acres of the
base. This plan, which had been proposed by a local developer, would have
provided 2,550 residences and sufficient commercial space to support 7,300 jobs.70
This was really a last ditch effort for any type of non-aviation development. In fact,
some of the Marin County elected officials were cautiously in favor of this plan, as
it would have expanded the area tax rolls, and created an alternative use to the airport
plan. With the public disapproval of this plan, City and County officials recognized
that few options remained for Hamilton.
One of the major issues seemed to be that neither Marin County nor Novato
needed development at Hamilton. This was a wealthy region with a considerable tax
base, and rising real estate values. If anything, Hamilton was a nuisance for the
area, and with the most recent closure action, local officials hoped to put an end to
this headache once and for all.
The final blow to private or public development of Hamilton came in
September 1989 (just a few months after the official closure announcement), when
the Marin County Board of Supervisors voted against the airport use and
recommended that the runway be flooded, making the area a marsh. Just a week
earlier, the Novato City Council had voted for essentially the same action.' Al
70 "Crushing defeat for Hamilton," Independent Journal, June 7, 1989.
71 "Marin Backs Hamilton Field Wetlands Plan," San Francisco Chronicle, Sep. 13, 1989.
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Aramburu, one of the Marin County Supervisors, summarized the feelings of the
Board:
For the first time, we are literally going to lay the issue
to rest. We've got to be realistic about what can and
can't be done. The prospect of ... not having Hamilton
as an issue is really refreshing."
Marin County's "wetlands plan"called for the transfer of the entire runway
area, approximately 700 acres, from the Army to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
The bay dikes (which protect the runway) would be breached, flooding the runway,
thus recreating a marsh.73
3.5 The Disputes Revisited
In retrospect, the disputes surrounding the reuse of Hamilton seemed to focus
on the community concerns regarding growth in the area, and regional interests
associated with the need to accommodate current and future air traffic requirements.
In the first base closure, the City of Novato's immediate interest, as identified
in the 1975 referendum, was to prevent the reuse of the base for general aviation.
Later in the 1970s, Marin County adopted a similar posture. Yet, as is suggested by
the 1989 vote regarding residential development, these communities also seemed
concerned about the use of the land for any type of development. When placed in
72 "Airstrip Flooding Boosted," Independent Journal, Sep. 13, 1989.
73 Ibid.
the context of Marin County's growth control mood during this period, the attacks
on the airport use appear to be a proxy for a no development in my backyard
posture.74 The other interests in this dispute, which emerged more clearly in the
late 1970s (when Marin backed out of its airport reuse plan), were the state and
regional agencies concerned about area air traffic and alternatives to the Hamilton
airport plan. These groups, represented in large measure by the BCDC seemed
legitimately concerned with planning for regional airport requirements and mitigating
the environmental impact resulting from required airport expansion. The Marin
constituency appeared to recognize these needs, but didn't want to see new or
expanded airports in their backyard.
This did not seem to be an issue of differing demographics between Marin
County and Novato. Both areas were economically well heeled, and did not view the
reuse of Hamilton as an engine for economic development. Early in the fray, Marin
seemed open to the idea of an airport largely because, from a regional perspective,
airport expansion seemed necessary. Yet, as Novato continued to voice opposition
to this plan, Marin eventually backed off, supporting a "balanced community" or "do
nothing" approach.
For a more detailed account of Marin County's growth controls, see Bernard J. Frieden, The
Environmental Protection Hustle, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1979).
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For their part, the federal authorities involved in this action may have missed
their opportunity to transfer title for Hamilton to Marin County back in the 1976-
1977 time frame. Their lack of clear direction, however, coupled with the complex
federal disposition procedures, resulted in a hold strategy, with increased costs
associated with maintaining this property over the past two decades. At this point,
the federal players seem to view Hamilton in the same way that Marin and Novato
do. The base is a nuisance and they are under increasing political and financial
pressure to "unload" it. As the Army makes plans for disposing of this land, they
are quickly realizing that flooding the runway may be the only remaining viable
solution.
CHAPTER 4 - THE GEORGE AFB CASE
4.0 Introduction
As is often the case in military base disposal, the community most affected
by the closure looks to have a big voice in the reuse planning process. This is
particularly true when the community faces such fundamental issues as the need for
tax revenue, water, and control of its environment. In some instances, a town or city
facing such challenges may take what Susskind calls a "positional bargaining"
approach. Such is the case with the City of Adelanto in its dealings with other
communities in the reuse of George Air Force Base.
4.1 The Context
George AFB is located in the Victor Valley area of San Bernardino County
in the high desert region of Southern California. The installation was developed at
the beginning of World War II as a new town. Most of the base land was developed
prior to the incorporation of the neighboring municipalities. In fact, of the 5,350
acres of property, only 537 acres have been annexed (to the City of Adelanto). Like
Hamilton, the base is a self-contained community, with a flightline area, industrial
district, major housing areas, community support facilities, and a golf course.
Victor Valley is comprised of four municipalities including Victorville,
Hesperia, Apple Valley, and Adelanto. Adelanto is by far the smallest of the
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communities, with a 1990 population of roughly 6,400 residents, as compared to the
other three city populations of approximately 41,000 to 44,000 residents each. The
area has experienced rapid growth over the past ten years, growing from 44,000
residents in 1980 to over 145,000 in 1990. When the region's unincorporated areas
are included, the population is estimated at over 200,000. This growth scenario is
not atypical for desert communities in Southern California in the 1980s."
Forecasts for the 1990s and beyond suggest that growth in the area will be
much less than that experienced in the 1980s. All four of the affected communities
seem to agree on the need for additional jobs in the region. But, Adelanto sees the
opportunity for major airport development, while its neighbors choose to pursue a
more conservative strategy.
4.2 The 1988 Closure and the Reuse Planning Process
George Air Force Base was identified for by the Base Realignment and
Closure Commission closure in December 1988. Immediately subsequent to the
announcement, the federal government sent in a team from the Office of Economic
Adjustment to assist the communities affected by the closure. To a large extent, as
the GSA did with Hamilton, the OEA advocated reuse of the installation through a
public benefit transfer of the aviation parcels of the base (runway, apron, and
surrounding buildings).
"George Air Force Base Reuse Market Analysis and Strategy," Economics Research Associates, Los
Angeles, February 1991.
In early 1989, the communities surrounding the base quickly galvanized to
form the George AFB Reuse Task Force. The task force included representatives
from San Bernardino County, Victorville, Adelanto, Apple Valley, and Hesperia.
This ad hoc group began working with the OEA and the Air Force Base Disposal
Agency (AFBDA) (the "owner" and disposal agent) to develop viable reuse plans for
the land.76 The five members were interested in the quick and sensible reuse of
George to replace the jobs lost as a result of the closure. However, the communities
were clearly affected in different ways. Being the smallest municipality, and, other
than Victorville, the only one directly abutting the base, Adelanto was heavily
impacted by the closure. Many of its residents worked on the base, and its
businesses serviced base workers and residents. The other communities were
impacted by the closure to a lesser extent, due to their more diverse industrial and
residential base of activities.
By September 1989, the base was officially identified for closure (with the
actual closure date set for December 1992), and the OEA was authorized to provide
grant money to develop a community reuse plan. By this time, however, it was also
clear that a schism had developed between the City of Adelanto and the other four
members of the Reuse Task Force. Adelanto had unilaterally withdrawn as a
member of this group and was pursuing its own objectives under the direction of the
Adelanto-George Air Force Base Reuse Commission. Moreover, Adelanto applied
for OEA financial assistance separately from the Task Force."
76 Interview with Peter D'Errico, Director Victor Valley Economic Development Authority (VVEDA),
George AFB, CA., June 23, 1993.
7 Letter from the Office of Economic Adjustment to Adelanto-George Air Force Base Reuse Commission,
September 1, 1989.
Concurrent with Adelanto's moves, the four other members of the George
AFB Reuse Task Force formed the Victor Valley Economic Development Authority
(VVEDA). VVEDA's mission was to continue the work of the task force in the
reuse and redevelopment of George AFB. Adelanto had been invited to join this
group, but declined to participate. By October, VVEDA had been awarded a
planning grant from the OEA, while Adelanto was told that funds were not available
to support two plans, and that they would need to work with VVEDA to develop a
consensus plan.7 8
It is unclear why Adelanto pulled out of the cooperative effort. Adelanto City
officials claim that their interests were not being adequately addressed through the
task force. Specifically, Adelanto appeared to have concerns regarding such
environmental impacts as noise, pollution, traffic, and control of the area's water
supply. 79 In understanding the history of Adelanto, however, it appears that other
issues were at play.
Adelanto is best characterized as a small "strip" town which, to a large extent,
has grown around George AFB. The city is situated directly in the path of the base's
primary aircraft approach, and, as such, approximately 85 percent of the
municipality's land is in a "noise impaction zone."80 The City was incorporated in
1970, almost 30 years after the base was opened. In 1976, the Adelanto
78 Ibid.
79 Interview with Mary Scarpa, Mayor, City of Adelanto, Adelanto, California, June 23, 1993.
80 Ibid.
Redevelopment Agency was formed with a conservative agenda of redeveloping a
small area of the City. By the early 1980s, however, the city adopted ordinances
which expanded the redevelopment district to include most of the city. By this time,
the redevelopment agenda included citywide infrastructure improvements, the
development of new municipal buildings (police station, fire station, and city office
building), and, more recently, acquisition and joint public/private development of
George AFB.8
Adelanto appears to have used their RDA as a means of encouraging growth
through real estate development. This strategy has, to some extent, paid off. Some
estimates indicate that the City of Adelanto has grown from a population of 6,400 in
1990 to close to 8,500 in 1993. Yet, from a fundamental economic standpoint,
Adelanto needs some form of growth through new jobs.
According to some local officials, Adelanto sees the base as an opportunity
for additional tax revenue. If its redevelopment district could include the base, it
could increase revenues through the RDA. This argument seems plausible.
However, a further look at Adelanto suggests that the city has pursued aggressive
development as an alternative location for residents and businesses from Orange
County. This "pro-development" strategy contrasts sharply with VVEDA's more
cautious and, by design, more slow moving redevelopment approach.82 The
81 "A Review of Financial Management Issues Relating to the City of Adelanto and the Adelanto
Redevelopment Agency," Harvey M. Rose Accountancy Corporation, CPAs, May 1993.
82 Interview with Peter D'Errico, VVEDA, June 23, 1993.
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differences between the two reuse groups is, to some extent, played out further in the
development of their reuse plans.
Other than the substantive issues concerning tax revenues and economic
development, Adelanto also seems to have had concerns about their voting rights in
the reuse planning collaboration. As one of five players, and the smallest in terms
of population, Adelanto appeared legitimately concerned with their ability to influence
the planning process. Yet, as the most affected community, Adelanto officials
believed that they should have a larger impact. The voting process seemed to be
unfair and failed to address Adelanto's concerns.
4.3 The George AFB Reuse Plans
The differences between the two competing plans are best explained in terms
of scale and the timing of future development. Both VVEDA and Adelanto agreed
that the reuse should be for an airport. However, VVEDA looked at the proposed
uses in terms of a largely publicly funded regional airport. By 1991, VVEDA
identified three alternatives for consideration.
- A regional commercial and corporate aviation airport within the base,
and reuse of other areas of the base for industrial, higher education,
office park, and recreational uses.
- An "evolving" airport, beginning as a regional airport, and expanding
to serve the Pacific Rim market.
- An "evolving" airport targeted at becoming a large hub commercial
airport.83
83 Ibid.
The common thread in all three development scenarios is a careful and
cautious start as a regional airport in the early stages, with the potential for greater
down stream growth and expansion. The VVEDA plans call for the long term use
of approximately 7,500 to 8,500 acres of development. The additional land required
would be authorized under an amendment approved under California development
law, calling for the designation of an eight-mile radius around the base as a
redevelopment district." George AFB would form the core of the reuse plan, with
the use of 2,000 to 3,000 acres of additional land in the unincorporated areas for
airport expansion requirements.85
Adelanto has developed a much more aggressive concept involving 20,000
acres of planned development as a megaport (the "High Desert International
Airport"). This proposal assumes the need for a large airport to serve the major
population centers of Southern California, due to the expansion constraints of the
John Wayne/Orange County Airport. Adelanto's scheme also relies on the
development of a rapid ground transportation system between Victor Valley and
major urban locations in Southern California. (However, the proposed high speed
train to be built between Orange County and Las Vegas is currently without
financing.)
8 California Assembly Bill 419 - the Eaves Bill.
85 "George AFB Reuse Market Analysis and Strategy," p. 111-8.
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In addition to the differences in scale, the two competing interests offer
alternative approaches to financing their redevelopment proposals. VVEDA plans to
use public financing and FAA grant money to develop the airport, with additional
revenue available from surrounding industrial and commercial uses. Their plan
would require a public benefit conveyance of much of the base for this purpose.
Adelanto's approach focuses on an outright "purchase" of the base property, followed
by an aggressive large-scale development plan using private financing. The City of
Adelanto has established a preliminary understanding with Koll Development wherein
Koll would act as the lead developer.
Throughout the period between September 1989, when planning commenced,
and January 1993, when the Air Force delivered their Record of Decision (ROD) on
the reuse of the base, a number of federal agencies were involved in the disposition
process. From the beginning of the federal disposal proceedings, it became apparent
that the federal players recognized VVEDA's reuse plan as the most viable option.
In fact, in identifying alternative reuse scenarios in the EIS process, The Air Force
Base Disposal Agency identified the VVEDA plan as the "proposed action" (a.k.a.
the "preferred alternative").86 Furthermore, the OEA and FAA worked closely with
VVEDA to monitor their airport planning efforts and to ensure compliance with the
EIR process. Other components of the federal process appeared to be moving in
tandem with the VVEDA plan. Adelanto appeared to be working almost
independently of the process, spending most of their time and resources on litigating
against VVEDA at every opportunity.87
86 Final Environmental Impact Statement - George AFB, January 1993.
87 In fact, during the period between 1989 and 1993, Adelanto has initiated over 15 lawsuits against VVEDA
and other players in the process.
4.4 The Impasse
The federal government's hopes for a consensus plan seemed to have vanished
by the time the two reuse plans were issued. By early 1992, concern for base reuse
intensified, as the date for actual closure was quickly approaching. Each side viewed
the debate in terms of their position and through the press and the courts, further
distanced themselves from their counterpart. This was especially true for the City
of Adelanto, which, through a series of lawsuits against every conceivable opponent,
effectively delayed important processes like the EIS, interim leasing, and
environmental cleanup and remediation. For its part, VVEDA seemed to focus more
on complying with federal disposal procedures and, with federal grant aid, developing
reuse plans, marketing strategies, and an airport master plan. Moreover, VVEDA
worked with the State of California on a Redevelopment Plan for the base, which
required a special amendment to the state's redevelopment law. In dealing with
Adelanto, VVEDA focused more on defending itself in court, and quietly questioning
the funding sources for its neighbors' expensive legal challenges.88
The impasse seemed to come to a head in July 1992 when the City of
Victorville initiated proceedings with the Local Agency Formation Commission
(LAFCO) to annex the base.89 If approved, this action would place effective control
88 Interview with Peter D'Errico, VVEDA, June 23, 1993.
89 Under California State Law, LAFCO will make an initial determination regarding which municipality
within a given county is best suited to annex a given parcel. This recommendation is then voted on by the
residents of that county. In the George AFB case, LAFCO determined that Victorville should be given
annexation rights.
of the base with Victorville (and VVEDA). Adelanto challenged the action, but by
April of the following year, the annexation was largely complete, with LAFCO
determining that Victorville was the best prepared to provide urban services to the
base.' Adelanto has continued to appeal this decision, however, it appears likely
that Victorville will be given the authority to annex the base.
4.5 Attempts at Mediation
A number of efforts to mediate the dispute were throughout the period
between 1991 and 1992. The first effort came relatively early in the reuse planning
process. In early 1991, the City of Adelanto had retained the services of a
professional facilitator to host a one-day workshop on planning for the reuse of
George AFB. Numerous groups attended and participated in the meeting, including
representatives from Adelanto, VVEDA, the federal government, state government,
and other interested parties. Although no specific agreements were developed, most
participants indicated positive impressions of the session, and a willingness to
participate in future meetings of this type. The OEA representatives at the meeting
were also impressed with the outcome. As such, they asked the facilitator to
continue his work as a mediator for the entire consensus building effort. OEA agreed
to fund the work through a special grant.
Letter from VVEDA to Curtis E. Cornelssen, Subject: Response to July 9, 1994 questionnaire, July 16,
1993.
Over the next three to four months, the facilitator and his team met with
representatives from both Adelanto and VVEDA. He interviewed all of the players
in private sessions, and in a number of group sessions, began to develop areas of
common concern and interest. With this information in hand, the facilitator mapped
out the positions of both parties and identified common points of agreement. He was
now prepared to begin working intensively with both groups to develop preliminary
agreements. Unfortunately, the participants decided against further facilitation/
mediation, and walked away from the table. 9'
The second attempt at mediation came in April 1993 from the Office of
Planning and Research (OPR) in the Governor's Office. OPR is one of the state
agencies heavily involved in California base closure and reuse planning. The OPR
Director contacted each party and offered to mediate some type of settlement. Both
groups responded by outlining their "positions" in writing to the OPR. But,
according to local officials from both Adelanto and VVEDA, the "mediator" was not
acting as an objective party, and nothing was done by the state to follow up on this
effort. 92
91 Telephone Interview with Daniel Iacofono, Facilitator, MIG Associates, July 26, 1993.
9 Interviews with Peter D'Errico, VVEDA and Mary Scarpa, Mayor, City of Adelanto, June 23, 1993.
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4.6 Federal Indecision
The issue of control of the reuse process came to a head in January 1993,
when the Air Force released its Record of Decision (ROD) from the Final EIS.
Based on their close coordination with federal officials, and diligence in adhering to
the federal process, VVEDA officials had assumed that their reuse plan would be
approved. At a minimum, VVEDA hoped for clear direction on the Air Force's
intention for the property. Instead, what was delivered was essentially no decision.
In its ROD, the Air Force essentially determined that most of the base
property was appropriate for a regional airport use. But, due to the lack of consensus
between the different interests, the federal government was going to follow a
"negotiated sale" process:
Parcels B and D, [which represent essentially all non-aviation portions
of the base] with some minor exceptions discussed in the detailed
summary, will be offered for competitive negotiated sale to VVEDA
and the City of Adelanto. A formal request for proposals will be
issued as soon as possible. Their proposals must identify the public
body recommended to receive airfield parcels A and C [the runway
and related aviation areas]. Selection criteria will include price, which
must be at least fair market value; a practical plan for financing; a
feasible, FAA-approved airport layout plan; and a qualified public
airport sponsor. The Air Force must reluctantly adopt this course of
action because of the lack of community consensus. If the current
local impasse is resolved, negotiations would be conducted with the
entity that is the consensus purchaser. In any event, if the Air Force
does not receive at least one satisfactory proposal, price and all other
factors considered, all or any of the property (including the airfield
parcels) could be offered for public sale. In that case, neither
VVEDA nor Adelanto would ave a favored position.93
93 Record of Decision on George AFB, CA, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve
Affairs, Installations and Environment), Washington, D.C., January 14, 1993.
This procedure suggests that certain non-aviation parcels of the base property would
be offered to the two groups via competitive bidding, and the successful (highest)
bidder would also be the recipient (through public benefit conveyance) of the aviation
parcels. If no acceptable proposal was presented, the Air Force would then open up
for public sale.94 Although from a technical standpoint, the Air Force may have
been following federal disposition procedures, this "winner takes all" strategy is a
new approach.
VVEDA's response was quick and resolute. Less than two weeks after the
ROD was issued, VVEDA and its members initiated correspondence questioning the
Air Force's decision. Moreover, VVEDA instituted its first and only lawsuit,
claiming that the Air Force had not followed its own procedures, and further
indicating that the federal government was ignoring the need to minimize the impact
of the closure on the local community.95 Furthermore, VVEDA suggested that the
Air Force's approach in this case appeared to focus more on their desire to generate
revenue than to assist the community.
For its part, Adelanto was generally pleased with the decision. This strategy
meshed nicely with their plan to "purchase" the base and develop it to its "highest
and best use".96 Adelanto's primary concerns focused on the timing of the action
(the sooner the better).
Ibid.
Letter from Victor Valley Development Authority to Federal Officials concerning the Air Force Record
of Decision, January 29, 1993.
Interview with Mary Scarpa, Mayor, City of Adelanto, June 23, 1993.
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4.7 Current Affairs
The George AFB case remains an ongoing dispute. At VVEDA's request, the
Air Force is currently reviewing its disposition decision and has promised some
response on this issue in the near future. LAFCO has given Victorville the green
light for annexing the base. And, Adelanto City officials are currently under a San
Bernardino County Grand Jury investigation for alleged misappropriation of city
funds.
Unfortunately, for all parties involved, this stalemate has resulted in wasted
resources and lost opportunities. From a federal perspective, significant time and
money has been expended, and the Air Force has been left with maintaining the
property. VVEDA has been unable to sign any leases or redevelop any property.
And, Adelanto has practically gone bankrupt in litigating against its "opponents." In
the meantime, its development partners appear to have walked from any potential
deal.
CHAPTER 5 - ANALYSIS
5.0 Introduction
The Hamilton and George cases suggest that where base disposal and reuse
planning involves multiple jurisdictions with different priorities for reuse of the land,
some level of conflict may be inevitable. Yet, what other attributes explain this
conflict? And, how do the participants manage this conflict? Were these disputes
about constitutional or legal rights? Even if the impasses revolved around positional
issues, was some key element present or missing which drove the outcomes?
In evaluating the events which lead to impasses in the Hamilton AFB and
George AFB cases, I will consider the following issues:
- First, we must ensure that the disputes in question were based on
positional arguments, rather than constitutional questions.
- It is also important to consider the factors in these cases that may have
contributed to the less than desirable outcomes.
- Next, what role could mediation have played in resolving these
conflicts? And, where would it have fallen short?
- Finally, I will re-introduce the mediation effort at George AFB to
analyze where this endeavor may have gone awry.
5.1 The Issues Revisited
In reconsidering the Hamilton and George AFB cases, a number of concerns
exist which are not readily apparent to the players involved. Clearly, different issues
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surfaced in each of the two cases. However, some commonalities do exist. The
following paragraphs provide a brief synopsis of what I see as the players' root
interests and concerns.
In the Hamilton case, both Novato and Marin County were concerned with
the need to control growth in their region. Novato seemed to have greater concerns
with this issue as it related to Hamilton. After all, the base was right in their
backyard. Growth control advocates ended up in opposition to those groups
advocating the need for sensible regional airport expansion. Airport proponents
included the FAA, the two Bay Area regional planning agencies (BCDC and RAPC),
and, in the early stages of the base reuse planning, Marin County. It seems apparent
that all parties were concerned with the need for environmental protection. However,
the Bay Area planning groups focused on mitigating the impact on other airports (by
foregoing having to expand into wetland areas) through the reuse of Hamilton's
existing facilities. Whereas, Novato (and later Marin) appeared largely unconvinced
of (or, perhaps, unconcerned about) this need. The federal government's focus was
on the orderly "disposal" of the base to reduce federal operating costs.
Airport expansion is always a controversial issue. No community wants to
see or hear additional airline traffic. Nor do the residents want the associated noise
and air pollution impacts. But this case arrived at a time when an ideal military
airport facility was becoming available for civilian use. Marin County and Novato
residents later proved that they saw no need for any type of development (even the
most limited use airport) at the former air base.
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The George AFB reuse planning game was somewhat different. All parties
involved, particularly the local surrounding communities, recognized the need for
economic development in terms of replacement jobs and additional tax base.
VVEDA and Adelanto, however, parted ways beyond that point. As a small
community on the edge of the base runway, Adelanto was initially concerned with
the environmental impacts of a redeveloped base. Although, on a more fundamental
level, it appears as though Adelanto was fighting for control and survival. The base
presented an opportunity for an industrial base and increased tax revenues for
Adelanto. The Air Force seemed to be concerned most with the cost savings
associated with disposing of the base. However, based on the results of their Record
of Decision, may have also seen the opportunity for additional revenue.
An interesting common element exists in both of these cases, which may help
to explain some of the difficulties in arriving at a consensus. Both Novato and
Adelanto were small communities heavily impacted by the closure of adjacent
military bases. The effect on Novato was predominantly physical. Novato City
officials and residents saw a potential problem in reusing the base for a regional
airport due to the potential future environmental impacts. As such, the City saw a
need to severely limit (if not stop) development on the base. The issues for Adelanto
were different. Unlike Novato, Adelanto depended on their base for economic
sustenance. City authorities recognized a need to control the redevelopment process
to ensure that Adelanto would survive. Yet, from a process standpoint, both of these
small communities pulled out of the larger planning consortiums due to a perceived
lack of fair representation in the process. City officials in both communities were
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clearly concerned with ensuring that their municipality's interests would be given a
fair shake. Thus, an issue for consideration is whether or not the community most
impacted physically, fiscally or otherwise should have a larger say in reuse of the
closing bases, even though their populations may represent just a small fraction of
the area population?
Because of the size of most military installations (in terms of both land mass
and economic impact), a base closure will often end up being a regional planning
problem. As this is the case, the county and other regional planning agencies will
likely want to have a big say in base reuse planning. This was certainly true in the
Hamilton and George experiences, where Marin County and VVEDA, respectively,
emphasized a broader perspective. Thus, balancing the needs of the communities
most directly impacted by the closure with the needs of the surrounding region
becomes a major challenge in the base closure endeavor.
5.2 The Problematic Elements
With some of the core issues in the open, let us now turn to a discussion of
the second question. What elements were present or missing from these cases which
may have contributed to the disputes which occurred?
5.2.1 Fairness, Voting Rights, and Power
In both situations, a relatively small community, heavily impacted by the
closure, fought for control of the reuse of the excess property. Further, in each case,
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these small municipalities felt that their voting rights in a joint effort, coupled with
their more intense desire for control, placed them at a disadvantage in the reuse
planning process. The underlying issue here is equality of power and fairness in
collaborative planning. In the planning forums for both cases, the larger community
(or regional) interests were able to outvote the small communities, resulting in an
uneven playing field. As such, the smaller community calculated their BATNA to
be unilateral action. In their view, they had better chances in the courts than in a
collaborative forum.
5.2.2 Lack of Face-to-Face Communication
Another feature common to both the Hamilton and George cases is the lack
of face-to-face contact between the competing interests. Much of the debate was
carried on through lawyers, the press, federal and state agencies, and public
referendums and initiatives, often resulting in positional bargaining and personal
attacks. The players began to lose sight of the real issues, and interests were
miscommunicated and misinterpreted. Additionally, because each of the players had
different agendas, none of the parties involved, including the federal agencies, could
provide objective advice to the disputants.
5.2.3 History of Conflict
Both of these scenarios involved some history of conflict and tension among
the competing interests. In the Hamilton case, Marin County and Novato had
established a record of confrontation with regional planning authorities even before
the base was first closed.97 And, according to the facilitator in the George case,
Adelanto perceived itself as "second class" in comparison with its more economically
vibrant neighbors.98 With histories such as these in place, the potential for conflict
was likely much greater.
5.2.4 Complex Issues
As with other public land use disputes, these cases involved complex technical
issues, requiring expertise beyond that of many of the disputants. As such, experts
were required to deal with federal disposal requirements. Before long, the key players
were using their consultants and lawyers to promote their positions.
5.2.5 Procedural Bureaucracy
The federal government's "disposal" process appears to have been detrimental
in both disputes. Both the GSA and the Air Force continued to work through the
formal disposition processes (federal land clearance, EIS, etc.) even though no
community consensus had been achieved. This further complicated matters as the
numerous federal agencies involved tended to contribute to the impasse by taking
positions with the different communities." Moreover, the complex and expensive
property disposition plans, most notably the EIS, have little meaning if no single
coordinated reuse plan has been developed.
'" See Frieden
98 Interview with Daniel Iacofono
" Recall from the Hamilton case where the FAA and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service took sides over the
issue of airport vs. wetlands uses.
5.2.6 Federal Indecision
One implementation problem apparent in both cases involves the lack of
clarity of the federal goals and objectives relating to base disposal. In both the
Hamilton AFB and George AFB actions, the federal disposal agencies (GSA and Air
Force, respectively) were inconsistent in identifying their objectives. This is most
notable in the George AFB Record of Decision (ROD) where the Air Force appeared
to be more concerned with "selling" the base than with sensible community
development. Fundamentally speaking, the federal disposal agencies seemed to fail
to set out with clear, identifiable objectives. The end result was either indecision,
or, like with George, a decision which caught the communities by surprise.
5.2.7 Lack of Effective Funding Delivery Systems
Results from the two cases suggest that the federal agencies involved in base
disposal and reuse planning have no effective delivery system for federal benefits
(grants, technical support, etc.). This issue relates to the need for building consensus
before the federal money spigot is turned on. Yet, even after consensus is reached,
how do we ensure that federal benefits are used wisely? The communities involved
will likely want to ensure that they have a say in how these funds are allocated.
Moreover, different local players may require varying forms of federal and/or state
assistance; and, to be effective, requests for aid should be coordinated with the
overall reuse planning effort.
5.2.8 No Federal Default Options
Finally, the federal "owner" seems to lack any undesirable default options
which would encourage competing interests to come together and build a coalition.
For example, in either of the two cases, in addition to encouraging collaboration, if
the feds could have suggested that if collaboration was not reached, they would pick
one of the plans (groups) over another, the local communities may have been more
interested in working together than taking their chances separately. Other strategies
might include federal land banking ("mothballing" the base), which, in the case of
George AFB, would not have done much for economic development. Or, perhaps
worse yet, the federal agency could indicate that the federal government has to
identify locations for new prisons, homeless/low-income housing communities,
nuclear disposal sites, or missile storage sites, and that without community consensus,
they would likely exercise their rights to site these "noxious uses" on the closing
base. The results of the Hamilton and George case indicate that the communities
who broke away from the consensus planning endeavor were not confronted directly
with such undesirable options.
5.3 Consensus Building Applied
With some the missing elements exposed which may have contributed to the
impasse, it seems appropriate to revisit the consensus building process and see if
these tools might have been helpful. The following points focus on the role that
mediation and consensus building might play in the base disposal and reuse planning
process.
5.3.1 Fairness in Base Reuse Planning
Novato and Adelanto both indicated a reluctancy to join a collaborative
planning effort because of their minority status. This issue of fairness is common to
many consensus building cases, and is typically addressed through the establishment
of a more equitable decisionmaking protocol. One approach, utilized in many public
policy disputes, is to require that all voices be given equal time, and that, on major
decisions unanimous consensus must be reached. This approach will generally be
more time consuming and frustrating than the simple majority vote strategy. Yet, if
the traditional approach precludes full representation and participation, the consensual
technique seems worth trying.
Another key feature of negotiation which may apply in achieving fairness is
"inventing options for mutual gain." "0 Take the case of the Adelanto vs. VVEDA
dispute. Both parties were looking for a strategy at George AFB which would
promote economic development. Adelanto seemed to focus more on involving the
private sector while, at least initially, VVEDA took a public sector approach. Boiled
down further, however, VVEDA was most interested in the runway and its
supporting environs, while Adelanto (and its development partner) was focused on
private development rights. These are not wholly incompatible objectives. VVEDA
could have taken the lead in developing the airport, while Adelanto could have been
given rights to develop industrial and commercial space. Or, better yet, Adelanto
may have rejoined VVEDA to pursue this strategy.
'0 Susskind and Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse, p. 117-120.
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5.3.2 Objective, Third-Party Mediation
Over time, in both of the cases analyzed, the disputes escalated from private
disagreement to intense hostilities played out in the press, the courts, and, public
meetings. In neither case did the parties negotiate face-to-face. This volatile
atmosphere created a wall which separated the community interests. Throughout the
land use planning process, most experts agree that productive debate is required to
build consensus.
Third party, objective mediation may prove worthwhile in the reuse planning
endeavor, particularly if this can be implemented at an early stage in the process.
In the George AFB case, one of the reasons that joint planning was difficult was that
both disputants "communicated" through the press and the courts. Because of the
animosity that had developed over time (even before the base was closed), the parties
found it cumbersome to negotiate.
According to public dispute resolution experts, the mediator's role is to
provide a clear, unbiased channel of communication, and to slowly bring the parties
into a working relationship, to establish a process by which the players can negotiate.
In both the Hamilton and George cases, mediation may have provided a means of
airing the different players' true interests and concerns, with the result being a
potential for dialogue and, ultimately, some level of negotiation. Instead, the
disputants made assumptions and predictions about their opponents intentions based
on news articles, legal maneuvers, and political speeches.
5.3.3 Joint Fact Finding
The base closure experiences analyzed suggest that the old saying "liars will
figure, and figures will lie" takes on new meaning in a base reuse dispute. In both
cases, each side had their own set of experts who, not surprisingly, generally
provided "factual" support for their sponsor's position. Unfortunately, the technical
issues surrounding military base closure actions are not well-suited to public debate.
In these instances, the result of competing arguments was indecision and inaction.
"Joint fact finding" may provide some assistance in these debates. If the
parties could support a single set of expert analyses, with some latitude for rebuttal,
the process might proceed more smoothly. If nothing else, the agencies involved
would likely save some time and money.
5.3.4 Delivery Vehicle for Federal Assistance
The federal government has historically provided a significant amount of
financial and technical support for communities affected by base closures. This
support arrives through direct planning grants, funding for environmental analyses
and property disposition plans, FAA airport planning studies, and ongoing technical
assistance through the OEA and like agencies. In cases where consensus has been
reached, decisions regarding the delivery of this support are relatively simple and
straightforward. Where an impasse exists, however, the federal government has
difficult choices to make regarding how and to which groups the authorities should
provide this assistance. In the Hamilton and George cases, this much needed federal
support was often placed on hold, misallocated, or, in some situations wasted on
fruitless studies.
The NIS approach presented in the first chapter offers an alternative to the
current system. NIS encourages the use of negotiation in the delivery of scarce
federal and state resources.' 01 In almost every base reuse scenario, alternative uses
will exist and exploration is warranted. Yet these endeavors might be better
coordinated through soliciting input from all of the players involved, and developing
agreements on how the research will be completed, and in what ways funds/assistance
will be delivered.
5.3.5 Forum for Discussion of the Issues
As noted in the Hamilton AFB case study, open public debate and/or voting
on complex issues is problematic in many ways. Base reuse planning is not easily
boiled down to basic pro/con or yes/no questions. An informal forum for thorough
discussion and analysis of these issues seems warranted.
Part of this effort might be accomplished through joint fact finding as
discussed previously. Negotiation theory suggests that, in developing different
options and drafting agreements, the parties should "focus on interests, not
positions." 2 In identifying the different interests, the players may find that the
issues are more complicated than they had imagined. For instance, in the Hamilton
effort, if a negotiating forum had been developed, Novato City officials may have
realized that their decisions impacted a much larger community, and that everyone
was going to have to make some sort of sacrifice.
Moore, "Negotiated Investment Strategy."
Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes.
5.4 Where Mediation Falls Short
Although the Hamilton and George cases seem ideally suited to mediation, this
approach may have proven cumbersome for a number of reasons. In both instances,
an imbalance of power existed. Both Novato and Adelanto viewed their situation as
a minority stakeholder with limited recourse against their more formidable opponents.
As a result of this and other factors, these municipalities decided to take unilateral
action through legal and political processes rather than sit at the negotiating table.
Furthermore, it was unclear to the parties involved that a consensual solution would
be any better than a unilateral approach. For some of the parties involved, delay and
stalemate seemed to have been advantageous strategies. In such cases, one of the
major concerns, therefore, is ensuring that the disputants are encouraged (or, if
necessary required) to negotiate. Mediation may offer some glimmer of hope in this
regard; however, other avenues may be required.
5.5 The "Failure" of Mediation at George AFB
Looking back, in the words of the George AFB facilitator, the players had a
number of major hurdles to overcome. First, the representatives involved had very
strong personalities, and both groups had a history of confrontation before the base
closed. Secondly, Adelanto had a long history of feeling "second class" in the Victor
Valley. The City of Victorville, which was a dominant force in VVEDA, was
viewed as a more successful community. Adelanto refused to let go of this image.
Finally, and probably most importantly, Adelanto was confident that they had more
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to gain through unilateral action, where they had "equal footing" than in a
cooperative effort, where the cards were stacked against them. 03 Many of these
problems, however, are common to a public dispute resolution case, and would not
necessarily negate the potential success of a mediation effort. As such, what other
attributes of this effort might explain the lack of consensus?
5.5.1 Mediation vs. Facilitation
The professional involved in this case described his role as a "facilitator" who,
through a series of meetings, mapped out the positions of the two major disputants
and attempted to identify common points of agreement." Although the difference
between mediation and facilitation may appear subtle, the complexity of this case may
have required more intense and aggressive mediation rather than a third-party
facilitator. Additionally, the facilitator involved in this effort did not specialize in
land use disputes. The lack of substantive base for working through these complex
issues may have been detrimental in the negotiating process.
5.5.2 "Contaminated" Entry
Often how the mediator enters the dispute can have an effect on the outcome
of the negotiations. For instance, in the George case, the facilitator was initially
retained by the City of Adelanto. In the eyes of VVEDA, this relationship may have
tainted the facilitator, even later when this professional is working in a larger context.
103 Ibid.
0 Interview with Daniel Iacofono, Facilitator, July 26, 1993.
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5.5.3 Commitment and Duration
The facilitator indicated that the effort may have failed due to a lack of time
and on-site support. The 3-4 month time frame is probably inadequate for a
negotiation at this scale. Smaller efforts of this type have required much more time
to resolve. Further, this endeavor is not a part-time effort. An intense, full-time
commitment was likely warranted. As the facilitator aptly put it " We sunk one
pillar, but did not build the foundation." 105
5.5.4 Encouraging Participation
Even with a full-time, concerted effort, the mediation may have proved
fruitless without some means of bringing the parties to the negotiating table. The
facilitator could not require the parties to participate, and in the end, had few if any
means at his disposal to encourage cooperation. Adelanto recognized an opportunity
to pursue its objectives through unilateral action.
For its part, the federal government seemed to underestimate both the
importance and the complexity of this collaborative planning process. This was
probably due to their lack of understanding of the local issues. Moreover, the federal
representatives failed to recognize the importance of their role in these disputes. As
a result, a number of the federal authorities involved characterized the experience as
a "failed effort." This is unfortunate, as federal involvement in these endeavors is
vital to a successful outcome.
105 Ibid.
This case suggests that some type of federal procedural or legislative
framework is needed for requiring the parties to negotiate. This is not to suggest
regulation of the outcome of the reuse planning process. Rather, I am proposing that
the federal government mandate a negotiation process.
5.6 Summary
The events of the George AFB mediation effort suggest that this endeavor may
have been missing some critical elements. It is unfair and shortsighted to criticize
this experiment as a "failed" mediation. As with other public disputes, the issues
were complex and the participants were generally hostile towards each other. Greater
commitment was needed from all players, and the federal government base disposal
process seemed to lack the tools needed to encourage and promote a full-scale
mediation effort.
CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION
6.0 Life Without Negotiation
It seems apparent from the two cases analyzed that mediated negotiation is not
a panacea for resolving base reuse planning disputes. These tools provide a process
that the federal government may choose to implement in cases where consensus
cannot be achieved.
President Clinton's recently announced "five-point" plan goes a long way
towards resolving many of the problematic features of the current base transitioning
process. Yet, the focus still seems to be on federal withdrawal, and may provide
limited assistance in cases involving multijurisdictional and other large-scale base
reuse planning disputes. Additionally, it appears unclear how these new federal
goodies will be delivered at the local level.
Consensual approaches to managing conflict, building collaboration, and
establishing multi-party agreements seem to provide some potential value in the
military base transitioning process. Moreover, federal procedures and guidelines are
already in place to implement these efforts.
6.1 The ADR Law and Base Closure
The federal ADR Law appears to provide many of the negotiation and
mediation tools necessary for managing base reuse planning conflicts. Other federal
agencies have already established pilot programs to institute these consensual
processes.
The ADR Law, however, does not provide any prescriptions for federal
default options in land use disputes. As noted in the previous chapter, such tools
appear to be a necessary component of an effective dispute resolution system.
6.2 Federal Default Options
One of the greatest challenges in arriving at some level of consensus is getting
the parties to the table. As each group evaluates its BATNA (Best Alternative to a
Negotiated Agreement),1o6 they will consider the advantages and disadvantages of
engaging in negotiation with the other parties. In the base disposal/reuse planning
game, if no consensus is reached, as seen in the Hamilton and George cases, the
federal government is left holding the property (and continuing to pay for its upkeep).
As such, the federal authorities need both carrots and sticks to get the participants to
play (and play fair).
106 Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes.
6.2.1 Federal "Carrots"
As noted in earlier discussions, the federal government provides much of the
funding and assistance for base reuse planning. These funds should come with
strings attached. For instance, at a minimum, the communities should be reminded
that if no consensus is reached, no planning money will be forthcoming. A more
proactive model might be to engage the players in negotiating the use of federal funds
through some mechanism similar to the NIS. Finally, to encourage participation, the
players should be shown "successful" cases where negotiation did occur (it does take
place at some level in all base closures).
6.2.2 Federal "Sticks"
Even with these positive incentives for participation, the local players may feel
that they are better off not engaging in negotiation and consensus building.
Furthermore, they may freeze the process through unreasonable legal actions or via
the press. In these instances, harsher measures may be necessary.
One "stick" for encouraging negotiation is for the federal authorities to
suggest that without consensus, they will be forced to choose one group's plan over
the other. Clearly, both sides will weigh the pros and cons of this gamble and may
still decide not to participate. But, in the end, the federal agency will be able to
make a decision. This will likely result in litigation. Yet, as we've seen in both of
our dispute experiences, litigation will likely occur in any case. The other problem
that this may pose is where neither of the planning groups has developed a reasonable
strategy. Here, the federal authorities may want to exercise their right to follow
federal disposition procedures and move to an open bidding/public auction process.
If the local communities affected by the closure are all looking for some form
of quick economic development, as was the case at George AFB, and, in the event
that consensus has not been achieved, the federal agency may want to threaten to
"bank" the land. In other words, the federal authorities may indicate that they will
be forced to follow a "do nothing" or "hold" strategy. Jobs and tax revenues are
great motivators for negotiation, and this approach may yield some benefits. The
down side is that the locals may call the bluff and agree to the banking. In this
scenario, the federal government would be left paying for maintenance of the land.
But, they might have done so in any case; so, this strategy may be worth a try.
Perhaps the most harsh federal action would be the threat of siting noxious
land uses at former military bases. For example, in a case where an impasse has
occurred, the federal agencies involved may encourage a negotiated solution by
suggesting that without some form of consensus, they will be forced to dig into their
federal priorities grab bag and, through the federal disposition process (where the
federal authorities can literally preempt the local communities with a federal use at
any time before title transfer), site an "undesirable" federal facility. Noxious uses
might include a federal prison, nuclear storage facility, hazardous waste storage
compound, missile silos, or some similar LULU (locally undesirable land use).
Clearly, this may end up backfiring, with community claims of federal preemption
of local land use authority.107  The strategy may, however, yield some results.
07 For a thorough discussion of federal vs. state and local land use rights and disputes, see Lyn Lloyd
Creswell's "Federal Agency - Local Government Land Use Negotiations: Vulnerabilities of the Federal
Bargaining Position," Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law, Vol. 33, 1988.
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Ironically, this tool may end up galvanizing local opposition, with the federal
response being: "OK, now that you've built consensus against this noxious use, let's
work on building consensus for some positive outcome."
The proactive approaches suggested above will likely yield more benefits than
reactive, after-the-fact solutions. Moreover, the use of federal default options fall on
some sort of continuum, with carrots being employed early in the process, and
harsher sticks being employed as required. With careful and thoughtful use of these
carrots and sticks early in the reuse planning game, it appears that some consensus
may have been attained in the George and Hamilton cases.
6.3 Negotiation in Future Base Closures
With the application of key components of the ADR Law, as well as the
development of new federal default options, mediated negotiation in future base
closure cases may be a viable approach to resolving multi-party disputes. In many
impasse situations, these tools will be worth trying. Otherwise, as this thesis
suggests, the federal government may be left holding excess property, and the
affected local communities might end up with no job replacement or new economic
development.
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